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Legislating Morality: The Duty to the Tax System
Reconsidered
Camilla E. Watson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Four years ago, I presented a paper at a symposium on professionalism
jointly sponsored by the University of Kansas Law School and the Kansas
Bar Association.' That paper espoused the view (contrary to what appears
to be the popular view among tax scholars)2 that tax lawyers owe no special
duty to the "tax system" 3 other than to abide by the law and the applicable
standards of professional conduct.4 During the four-year interim since my
last visit to Kansas, however, we have witnessed the deleterious effect of the
IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 19985 (RRA '98) on IRS enforcement
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia, School of Law. I thank my friends and colleagues Lorie
Johnson, Margaret V. Sachs, Charles R.T. O'Kelley, and Alan Watson for very helpful comments on an
earlier version of this paper. This paper also was presented at a faculty colloquium at the University of
Georgia. I thank Randy Beck and members of the Faculty Seminars Committee for inviting me to present
my research.
1. See generally Camilla E. Watson, Tax Lawyers, Ethical Obligations, and the Duty to the System,
47 U. KAN. L. REV. 847 (1999) (Special Issue on Professional Responsibility).
2. See, e.g., Mortimer M. Caplin, Responsibilities of the Tax Advisor-A Perspective, 40 TAXES
1030, 1032 (1962) (stating tax practitioners must insure that the system is "functioning honestly, fairly
and smoothly"); Frederic G. Comeel, Guidelines to Tax Practice Second, 43 TAX LAW. 297, 301 (1990)
(noting that tax lawyers should "contribute to [the] improvement of tax laws and their administration");
Linda Galler, The Tax Lawyer's Duty to the System, 16 VA. TAX REV. 681, 693-98 (1997) (reviewing
BERNARD WOLFMAN ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERAL TAX PRACTICE (1995) (arguing that tax
lawyers owe additional duties to the revenue system and to the government)).
3. The definition of the term "tax system" is important because it establishes the context in which
"the duty" is owed. Both terms have had a variety of meanings. See Galler, supra note 2, at 687-88
(recommending clarifying the meaning of a lawyer's "duty to the system"). In my previous article,
Watson, supra note I, and in this one, I use the term "tax system" to mean the federal self-assessment
system of taxation in general, of which the IRS and its system of administration that comprise the revenue
raising process are paramount. See Galler, supra note 2, at 688 (defining the term "tax system").
4. See Watson, supra note 1, at 909 (arguing the "lawyer's only duty should be to obey the rules of
law and ethics"). In general, the applicable standards of professional conduct are the rules of the various
state supreme courts of the jurisdictions in which the lawyers practice and the standards of practice
applicable to tax professionals appearing before the IRS. These latter standards are found in regulations
promulgated by the IRS, collectively referred to as "Circular 230." See 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-10.97 (2002)
(setting forth ethical rules specific to practice before the IRS). In addition, the U.S. Tax Court has
adopted the ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility to which those practicing before it must
adhere. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 201.
5. Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685.
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6and collection activities, and consequently on taxpayer compliance. Almost
daily, new corporate accounting scandals and abusive tax avoidance
transactions are being reported in newspapers across the country. Thus, I
have been invited to reconsider my earlier position specifically in light of
RRA '98.
The problem with abusive tax schemes lies not with the wage earners
and lower income taxpayers, but rather with the upper income individual
and corporate taxpayers who have money to shelter and resources to hire the
best professional advice on how to avoid paying taxes. The sophistication of
these taxpayers and their advisors has enabled them to exploit the tax system
through the use of elaborate tax avoidance schemes. These schemes would
not have been possible without the help of tax professionals. Yet, these
schemes have hurt the professionals' clients, damaged the national economy,
and undermined the federal tax system.
What does this say about a duty to the tax system, and what difference
does it make whether or not tax practitioners have a discrete duty to the tax
system? Should the duty of lawyers practicing tax law be different from the
duty of other tax practitioners?
If there is a discrete duty to the tax system, it will affect how tax
practitioners interact (or should interact) with the Service. In addition, if
there is such a duty, it should be a normative one in which clear expectations
are firmly established, and the ability of all tax practitioners to comply is
feasible in practice. But this has not been the case, and that has led to our
present problems.
II. THE ADVERSARIAL NATURE OF THE INTERACTION BETWEEN TAx
PRACTITIONERS AND THE GOVERNMENT
Tax practitioners representing clients before the Service must conform
their conduct to the standards of practice embodied in Circular 230.7 Since
these standards were drafted by the government, their principle focus
6. See David Cay Johnston, Departing Chief Says the IRS Is Losing War on Tax Cheats, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at A l (quoting the statement of outgoing Commissioner Charles 0. Rossotti that
"[t]he great majority of tax cheats.., will be allowed to get away without paying their full share because
the IRS lacks the money to enforce the law"); see also Jennifer Corbett Dooren & Mark H. Anderson, IRS
Says Cost of Tax Scams Is Getting Higher, WALL ST. J., Apr. 12, 2002, at A4 (stating that the Internal
Revenue Service estimates that as much as $40 billion in improper tax avoidance might be going
undetected, and the problem could be even worse.); Brant Goldwyn, Congressional Panel Tells IRS of
Concerns About Compliance, Modernization Programs, DAILY TAX REP., May 15, 2002, at G-6
(explaining that GAO estimates unpaid taxes at $239 billion but considers only $20 billion of this amount
collectible according to James R. White, director of tax issues).
7. See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. §§ 10.0-10.97 (2002).
1198 [Vol. 51
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understandably is on the Service and the standards of professional conduct
the Service expects from those admitted to practice before it.8 Lawyers
further must conform to the standards of professional conduct of their
individual state bar associations, many of which are modeled on the ABA's
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules). 9
The principle focus of the Model Rules is on conflict resolution and
litigation, and of course, on the client. Thus, important aspects of the Model
Rules are that lawyers must represent their clients zealously within the
bounds of the law,' and that they must preserve the confidences of their
clients. "
Since the principle focus of the two drafting bodies was different, it is
not surprising that there are conflicts between the two standards of
professional conduct. These conflicts can cause problems even for those
lawyers who wish to behave honorably and ethically. For those who do not,
the conflicting standards offer a window of opportunity. Until these conflicts
are resolved, there can be no meaningful duty to the tax system.
8. A variety of professionals may represent clients before the IRS. These include attorneys,
certified public accountants, enrolled agents, enrolled actuaries, and others. See id. § 10.3 (explaining
who may practice).
9. MODEL RULES OF PROFL CONDUCT (2002) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. In 1983, the Model
Rules replaced the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, created in 1969. Some states continue to
adhere to the Model Code, which has a different format from the Model Rules. Prior to 1969, the ABA
standards were encompassed in the Canons of Professional Ethics. For a history of the ABA Rules, see N.
Lee Cooper & Stephen F. Humphreys, Beyond the Rules: Lawyer Image and the Scope of
Professionalism, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 923, 925-31 (1996) (discussing the history of the ABA Rules). See
also Mark Hansen, Hot offthe Press, A.B.A. J., June 2002, at 37, 38 (discussing proposed amendments to
the Model Rules). The ABA Rules are merely a model and do not apply in themselves unless they have
been adopted by state bar associations.
10. See MODEL RULES, supra note 9, R. 1.3 cmt. ("A lawyer must also act with commitment and
dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.").
11. See MODEL RULES. supra note 9, R. 1.6 (stating that "[a] lawyer shall not reveal information
relating to the representation of a client" without the client's informed consent). The ABA's House of
Delegates considered an extensive review of the Model Rules. This review concluded in 2002. One of
the recommendations, which was rejected, was an amendment to Rule 1.6 to allow a lawyer to disclose
client confidences to "prevent, rectify or mitigate financial losses arising out of crimes or frauds" of the
client. See Hansen, supra note 9, at 38. This amendment was proposed in order to align the Model Rules
with the vast majority of states that have adopted a more liberal confidentiality rule. See James Podgers,
Lawyer Ethics in a State of Flux: Revisions in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct May Soon
Be Adopted in Your State. A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 46, 48. It is predicted, however, that the ABA will
reconsider this revision in the aftermath of the Enron scandal. See Nancy J. Moore, Revisions, Not
Revolution: Targeting Lawyer/Client Relations, Electronic Communications, Conflicts of Interest ...
A.B.A. J., Dec. 2002, at 48, 50.
11992003]
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A. Is the Filing of a Tax Return an Adversarial Process?
One of the unresolved conflicts between the government and the ABA is
whether the filing of a tax return is considered adversarial. The ABA set the
stage for this controversy in two formal opinions. Under the Model Rules, a
lawyer has a duty to disclose to a tribunal adverse controlling authority, as
well as adverse material facts, that have not been disclosed by the opposing
party.12 In Formal Opinion 314, issued in 1965,13 the ABA concluded that
the Service is neither a "true tribunal nor even a quasi-judicial institution,"
because it is "not designed and does not purport to be unprejudiced and
unbiased in the judicial sense."' 4
Therefore, a lawyer owes the IRS no greater deference than the lawyer
owes any other adversarial party.' 5 The lawyer's duty is to preserve the
confidences of the client within the constraints of the rules of professional
responsibility. Thus, the confidences of the client remain inviolate.16
12. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, R. 3.3.
13. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof I Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965), reprinted in BERNARD
WOLFMAN, ET AL., STANDARDS OF TAX PRACTICE app. A, at 445 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter Formal Op.
314].
14. Id. at 446. In reaching this conclusion, the ABA Committee stated:
The Internal Revenue Service is neither a true tribunal, nor even a quasi-judicial institution.
It has no machinery or procedure for adversary proceedings before impartial judges or arbiters,
involving the weighing of conflicting testimony of witnesses examined and cross-examined by
opposing counsel and the consideration of arguments of counsel for both sides of a dispute.
While its procedures provide for "fresh looks" through departmental reviews and informal and
formal conference procedures, few will contend that the service provides any truly
dispassionate and unbiased consideration to the taxpayer. Although willing to listen to
taxpayers and their representatives and obviously intending to be fair, the service is not
designed and does not purport to be unprejudiced and unbiased in the judicial sense.
Id.
15. Formal Op. 314 begins by stating:
The Internal Revenue Service is an instrumentality of the executive branch of the
Government, and therefore lacks some of the basic attributes of disinterestedness and
impartiality which characterize a true court. Canon 26 imposes upon a lawyer practicing
before the service the duty not to mislead it deliberately or affirmatively by false or misleading
statements. At the same time no canon of ethics imposes upon a lawyer any duty (except to
prevent the commission of a crime) to disclose information acquired as a result of the
attorney-client relationship which would tend to reveal the weakness of his client's case, to
prejudice his client's rights, or to bring on a controversy with the Government.
Id. at 445.
16. Formal Op. 314 is clear in its emphasis on the client. In its last paragraph the Opinion states:
So long as a lawyer remains within these limitations, and so long as his duty is "performed
within and not without the bounds of the law", he "owes '[sic] entire devotion to the interest
of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability', to the end that nothing be taken or be withheld from him, save by
the rules of law, legally applied" is his practice before the Internal Revenue Service, as
elsewhere (Canon 15).
Id. at 449.
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A shortcoming of the opinion, however, is that it failed to distinguish
among the various roles a lawyer plays in representing a client in the tax
process. These roles, in general, are advisor, return preparer, and advocate. 1
7
In her role as an advisor, a lawyer may advise her client on the tax
consequences of prospective transactions, as well as on how to treat items on
a current tax return. If the lawyer receives compensation for rendering
advice that constitutes a substantial portion of the return, she may be
considered a return preparer even though she does not physically complete
the return or sign it.' 8  In fact, she may never see the return, but as a
nonsigning return preparer, the lawyer is potentially subject to the liability of
a signing preparer, which includes the civil penalty for substantial
understatements of tax liability.' 9
17. Watson, supra note 1, at 853-55. In representing a taxpayer/client, these are the three principal
roles that a tax lawyer plays, although there have been other roles identified. See Theodore C. Falk, Tax
Ethics, Legal Ethics, and Real Ethics: A Critique of ABA Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX LAW. 643,
645-46 (delineating seven different roles that a tax lawyer plays in the tax process).
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-15(a)(1) (as amended in 2002). Whether the advice is substantial is
determined by the length, complexity, and the amount of tax liability or refund in that portion of the return
compared to the entire return as completed. The advice must be sufficient to make the completion of the
return "largely a mechanical or clerical matter." Id. In addition, the advice rendered must relate to a
completed transaction, as opposed to one that is contemplated. Id. § 301.7701-15(a)(2)(i).
19. I.R.C. § 6694(a). The preparer's obligations differ depending upon whether the preparer is a
signing or a nonsigning preparer. A nonsigning preparer fulfills her duty when she advises the taxpayer or
the signing preparer or both (whomever has solicited her advice) that the position lacks substantial
authority and that a substantial understatement penalty may apply unless the position is disclosed. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(ii) (as amended in 1992). The form of the statement depends on the form of the
advice. If the advice is required to be rendered in writing, the statement must be in writing. Treas. Reg. §
1.6694-2(c)(3)(ii)(A) (as amended in 1992). If the advice is oral, the statement can be oral. Id. In the
event of a subsequent question about the role of the preparers, however, the nonsigning preparer should
make contemporaneous notes to document the fact that the disclosure was given. Id.
If the taxpayer is required to disclose the position, a Form 8275 Disclosure Statement (or a Form
8275-R if the position is contrary to a rule or regulation) must be attached to the return. Disclosure may
be made on the return itself if in accordance with IRS specifications. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3)(i)-(ii)
(as amended in 1992); see also Rev. Proc. 97-56, 1997-2 C.B. 582-83 (disclosure must be specific,
monetary amount must be verifiable, and the position must be taken in good faith).
An understatement must be distinguished from an underpayment. Both may result in a
deficiency due and owing, but an understatement penalty applies whether or not there has been an
underpayment of tax. Carryovers and carrybacks of deductions and credits may reduce the amount of an
underpayment, but not the amount of an understatement. Similarly, amounts not shown on the return that
were previously assessed or collected without assessment may reduce the amount of an underpayment, but
may have no effect on an understatement. See I.R.C. § 6664(a) (noting that the calculations under §
6664(a) only apply to underpayments).
Since the taxpayer's accuracy related penalty under I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2) applies to an
underpayment of tax liability, the preparer may be subject to an understatement penalty even though the
taxpayer is not subject to an accuracy-related penalty.
HeinOnline  -- 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1201 2002-2003
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If the taxpayer and the Service disagree on the proper tax treatment or
characterization of an item on the return, a lawyer may represent the taxpayer
in an administrative appeal before the Service, or in court if the disagreement
leads to litigation. In either case, the lawyer serves as an advocate for the
client against the government. 20 As an advocate, the lawyer's relationship
with the IRS is clearly adversarial, as it is with any other third party
opponent. But the lawyer's role in representing a client during the
examination or audit of a tax return is not as clear.2'
As an advocate, a lawyer is justified in advising her client against
volunteering information to a revenue agent, and the lawyer herself has no
22
obligation to voluntarily disclose weaknesses in the client's case. In fact,
the lawyer is prohibited from disclosing confidences of her client unless she
has the express permission of the client, or one of the narrow exceptions to
confidentiality applies under the legal rules of professional conduct. On the
other hand, if the lawyer is not considered an advocate, she owes a greater
duty to the government to cooperate fully and completely in the examination
of her client's return.
Formal Opinion 314 further stated that a lawyer could "freely urge" a
return position that was most favorable to the client as long as there was a
11 23reasonable basis" for the position. But over time, this standard gave rise
to complaints from both the tax bar and the Service that many lawyers and
other tax professionals were interpreting this minimum ethical standard to
support the use of any colorable claim to justify the exploitation of the audit
24lottery. In response to these concerns, the ABA issued Formal Opinion 85-
352 in 1985, which restated the governing standard as a "realistic possibility
20. Note that non-attorneys may represent taxpayers in the Tax Court provided they file an
application and pass an examination administered by the court and they also may practice before the IRS.
TAX CT. R. PRAC. 200(a)(3).
21. See Loren D. Prescott, Jr., Challenging the Adversarial Approach to Taxpayer Representation,
30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693, 730-31 (1997) (admitting that "the case for partisan advocacy is more
persuasive in the context of an audit." but concluding "[tlhe purpose of the internal revenue audit is to
confirm compliance, not to resolve disputes"); see also infra notes 96-115 and accompanying text
(discussing the posture of an audited taxpayer's attorney towards the IRS).
22. The lawyer has a duty to avoid giving false or misleading information to a Treasury employee.
31 C.F.R. § 10.51 (2002). Under the ABA's Model Rules, the lawyer may not advise or assist a client in
conduct the lawyer knows is criminal or fraudulent. MODEL RULES, supra note 9, R. 1.2(d). Moreover, a
lawyer may not deliberately mislead the IRS, either by misstatement or by silence, and may not permit her
client to mislead. Formal Op. 314, supra note 13, at 448.
23. Formal Op. 314, supra note 13, at 447-48. A higher standard applied to tax shelter positions
which subsequently were addressed in ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof]I Responsibility, Formal Op. 346
(1982), reprinted in WOLFMAN ET AL., supra note 13, app. B, at 451.
24. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'] Responsibility, Formal Op. 85-352 (1985), reprinted in
WOLFMAN, ET AL.. supra note 13, app. C. at 459 [hereinafter Formal Op. 85-352] (reconsidering Formal
Op. 314).
[Vol. 511202
HeinOnline  -- 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1202 2002-2003
2003] Legislating Morality 1203
of success if the matter is litigated." 25 This opinion further clarified that a
lawyer has no duty to disclose to the government an aggressive return
26position that meets the new standard. In reaching this conclusion, the ABA
Standing Committee reasoned that the filing of a tax return with an
aggressive position "may be the first step in a process that may result in an
adversary [sic] relationship between the client and the IRS. 27
While the restated standard was intended to raise the bar on the
28minimum ethical standard of reporting return positions, nevertheless
25. Id. at 461. A further reason for the restatement was that neither the Model Code nor the Model
Rules employed the reasonable basis language in discussing the lawyer's duty in advising or presenting
return positions for a client. Thus, the Standing Committee thought it appropriate to conform the standard
of Formal Opinion 314 to that of the Model Rules. Id. at 460.
26. Id. at461.
27. Id. at 460. In addressing this issue, Formal Opinion 85-352 differentiated the roles of the lawyer
as return preparer and advisor. As a return preparer, the lawyer may recommend an aggressive return
position without disclosure if the lawyer has a "good faith belief in the validity of [the] position." Id. at
461. This means that the position cannot be frivolous and the lawyer must have "a good faith belief that
those positions are warranted in existing law or can be supported by a good faith argument for an
extension, modification or reversal of existing law." id. The opinion goes on to state: "A lawyer can
have a good faith belief in this context even if the lawyer believes the client's position probably will not
prevail. However, good faith requires that there be some realistic possibility of success if the matter is
litigated." Id.
In the lawyer's role as an advisor, the opinion focuses on the substantial understatement penalty
applicable to taxpayers. Id. at 461. Section 6662 of the I.R.C. allows the taxpayer to take an aggressive
return position without disclosure if there is substantial authority for the position. If there is no substantial
authority, the taxpayer may be liable for a substantial understatement penalty unless there is a reasonable
basis for the position and the position is adequately disclosed. I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B). If the position is
not disclosed, the taxpayer may avoid the penalty by showing that she acted in good faith and with
reasonable cause. I.R.C. § 6664(c).
Under Formal Opinion 85-352, the lawyer should advise the client of the likelihood of success if
the position is challenged by the Service, as well as the potential penalties that might apply. The lawyer
further must advise the client that the substantial understatement penalty may be avoided by disclosing the
position. If the client decides not to disclose, then according to the Opinion, "the lawyer has met his or
her ethical responsibility with respect to the advice." Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 24, at 461.
Under Circular 230, a preparer may not sign a return without disclosing a position that she
believes does not have a realistic possibility of success. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a) (2002). Generally, if a
return position does not meet the realistic possibility standard, it also will not meet the substantial
authority standard. The converse does not necessarily hold true, however, because a return position may
have a realistic possibility of success even though there is no substantial authority in favor of the position.
Thus, a position with substantial authority is a stronger position "than one that is arguable but fairly
unlikely to prevail in court." 16 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) 9[39,652.024 (2003) (discussing Treas. Reg.
§ 1.6662-4(d)(3)(i) (as amended in 1998)). The difference between the two standards is that a preparer
may advocate a position without disclosure if there is a good faith argument for an extension, modification
or reversal of existing law and the preparer believes the position has at least a one-in-three chance of
success. In that case, the preparer may sign the return even though the taxpayer's standard is not met,
provided the preparer has advised the client on avoiding the penalty through disclosure. Circular 230, 31
C.F.R. § 10.34 (2002).
28. See Paul J. Sax, et al., Report of the Special Task Force on Formal Opinion 85-352, 39 TAX
HeinOnline  -- 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1203 2002-2003
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Formal Opinion 85-352 has been heavily criticized, primarily for its
characterization of the return process as adversarial. 29  As various
commentators have noted, the purpose of filing a tax return "is to fulfill the
taxpayer's legal obligation of disclosure, reporting and self-assessment.,
30
This is an obligation imposed upon all taxpayers under the voluntary
compliance system and it must be taken seriously if the tax system is to
operate efficiently. Thus, the duty to pay taxes has been referred to as "a
special obligation.'
Another criticism of the ABA's stance is that the return preparation
process involves very little, if any, interaction with the Service. Indeed, this
32was intended under the voluntary compliance system. A Special Task
Force, appointed by the Tax Section of the ABA to comment on Formal
Opinion 85-352, attempted to soften the opinion's adversarial view by
noting that the filing of a return is not an adversarial proceeding, but "ethical
considerations regarding advocacy" can apply in the reporting process,
particularly when a tax return contains an aggressive position.33
Most practitioners and tax scholars alike would agree that the filing of a
tax return is a duty imposed upon all taxpayers and as such, is not (and
should not be considered) adversarial. This begs the question of why is
there any controversy over the duty to file a tax return?
LAW. 635, 638 (1986) (noting higher ethical standards for reporting). The Task Force noted that the
"reasonable basis" standard was intended "to set a relatively high standard of tax reporting," but that this
standard "had become a low one." Id. at 638. The Task Force differentiated the new standard from the
old one:
[T]he new standard requires not only that there be some realistic possibility of success, if
litigated, rather than merely a construction that can be argued or that seems reasonable, but
also that there be more than just any possibility of success. The possibility of success, if
litigated, must be "realistic." A possibility of success cannot be "realistic" if it is only
theoretical or impractable. This clearly implies that there must be a substantial possibility of
success, which when taken together with the assumption that the matter will be litigated,
measurably elevates what had come to be widely accepted as the minimum ethical standard.
Id. at 638.
29. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 17, at 647 (characterizing the audit, rather than the filing of the return.
as the first step in the adversarial process); Gwen Thayer Handelman, Constraining Aggressive Return
Advice, 9 VA. TAX REV. 77, 95 (1989) (noting that a tax return should not be filed in an adversarial
posture); Prescott, supra note 21, at 693-94 (generally criticizing the legal profession's characterization of
the tax professional's interaction with the IRS).
30. Watson, supra note 1, at 854 (citing Sax et al., supra note 28, at 640); see also Falk, supra note
17, at 649 ("[A] tax return is ... how the taxpayer proposes to comply with tax laws.").
31. William D. Popkin, Client-Lawyer Confidentiality, 59 TEx. L. REV. 755, 783 (1981).
32. Watson, supra note 1, at 853-54.
33. Sax et al., supra note 28, at 640-41.
34. But see Frank J. Gould, Giving Tax Advice-Some Ethical, Professional, and Legal
Considerations, 97 TAX NOTEs 523, 529-30 (2002) (noting that a taxpayer is permitted to take an
aggressive return position, even if the position is unlikely to succeed in court); Joe Thomdike, Civilization
at a Discount: The Morality of Tax Avoidance, 95 TAX NOTES 664, 666 (2002) ("Paying taxes has always
HeinOnline  -- 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1204 2002-2003
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1. Aggressive Return Positions
The controversy arises over the tax practitioner's duty when the client's
tax return contains an item based on an aggressive position.35 The problem
is that the preparer's legal and ethical standards differ from the taxpayer's
penalty standard. This is one of the factors that has given impetus to those
professionals who have aggressively marketed tax sheltered proposals and
tax avoidance schemes, many of which are considered abusive.
a. The Preparers' Standards
Under the Internal Revenue Code, a preparer cannot recommend a
frivolous position, defined as "one that is patently improper." 36 If in good
faith the preparer recommends a position that does not have a realistic
possibility of success on its merits, the position must be disclosed in
accordance with the regulations, or the preparer will be subject to an
understatement penalty.37  A "realistic possibility of success" is defined
under the regulations as one that has at least a one-in-three chance of being
sustained on its merits.38
been an adversarial process, pitting taxpayers against the fisc").
35. See, e.g., Falk, supra note 17, at 647 (stating that Formal Opinion 352 suggests that an
adversarial relationship between the taxpayer and the government arises when a return with an aggressive
position is filed); Handleman, supra note 29, at 95 (arguing that Formal Opinion 352 "condones
deception" because it advises a lawyer to take aggressive return positions withough disclosure); James P.
Holden, Constraining Aggressive Return Advice: A Commentary
, 
9 VA. TAX REV. 771, 775-77 (1990)
(discussing standards of conduct for tax attorneys when their clients adopt "aggressive" positions in their
returns); Mark H. Johnson, Does the Tax Practitioner Owe a Dual Responsibilit), to HIS Client and to the
Government?-The Theor,. 15 U. S.C. L. SCH. TAX INST. 25. 31-37 (1963) (arguing tax attorneys owe
primary obligation to clients); Prescott, supra note 21, at 713.
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(2) (as amended in 1992); I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3).
37. I.R.C. § 6694(a): see also supra note 19. Disclosure will insulate the preparer from liability only
if the position is not frivolous. I.R.C. § 6694(a)(3).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1992). This determination must be made by the
"reasonable and well-informed analysis [of] a person knowledgeable in ... tax law." Id. In making this
determination, the taxpayer's chances in the audit lottery may not be considered. Id.
Formal Opinion 85-352 itself did not attempt to quantify the standard, but the Task Force did.
See Sax et al., supra note 28, at 638-39 ("A position having only a 5% or 10% likelihood of success, if
litigated, should not meet the new standard. A position having a likelihood of success closely approaching
one-third should meet the standard"). In determining whether a position has a one-in-three chance of
success, the Task Force noted that the likelihood "of concession in the bargaining process of settlement
negotiations" may not be considered. Id. at 639.
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The amount of this penalty is $250 per return,39 which is not significant
in itself unless the preparer files multiple returns with aggressive,
undisclosed positions. But if the Service suspects that the preparer's returns
demonstrate a pattern of noncompliance with the return preparer provisions,
it may examine other returns prepared by that preparer to determine whether
this is the case.4 ° If the preparer can establish that she acted in good faith
and that the understatement was due to reasonable cause, the penalty will not
apply.
4 1
Circular 230 also employs the realistic possibility standard and thus
conforms the practitioner's ethical standard to the preparer's penalty
standard.42 Under Circular 230, a preparer is ethically obligated to avoid
advancing a frivolous position, and to recommend disclosure of a position
that does not have a realistic possibility of success. 43 While this is logical on
its face, nevertheless, conforming the two standards raises several problems.
First, despite an earlier, unsuccessful attempt during the 1980s to re-
characterize the return preparation process as non-adversarial, the Treasury
Department capitulated to the demands and criticisms of the legal profession
by adopting the ABA' s "realistic possibility of success" standard in Circular
230.44 Since the issue was squarely raised by the Treasury Department, its
failure to endorse a non-adversarial view of the return preparation and filing
process has given credence to the ABA's position that the process is
adversarial, which is inconsistent with a practitioner's discrete duty to the tax
system.45
39. I.R.C. § 6694(a). This amount increases to $1000 per return for willful or reckless conduct.
I.R.C. § 6694(b).
40. This is part of its "Return Preparer's Program." See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) §
20.1.6.3.5 (2002).
41. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(d) (as amended in 1992). Reasonable cause will be determined after
considering all facts and circumstances, but specific factors to consider include the nature and complexity
of the error causing the understatement, the frequency of errors, the materiality of the errors, the
preparer's normal office practice, and whether the preparer relied on the advice of another preparer. Id. §
1.6694-2(d)( 1)-(5).
42. See Circular 230, 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(a)(1) (2002).
43. Id.
44. For a discussion of the earlier proposal by the Treasury Department to revise Circular 230 to
clarify that a "tax return is not a submission in an adversary [proceeding]," see Michael C. Durst, The Tax
Lawyer's Professional Responsibility, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 1027, 1051 (1987). See also Prescott, supra
note 21, at 721-22 (describing the "realistic probability standard").
45. As one commentator has stated:
The Rules of Practice make no effort to modify the adversarial approach to taxpayer
representation by imposing duties on the lawyer and other tax practitioners that are owed to
the government in recognition of their role as members of the tax bar and out of concern over
the effects of partisanship on the tax compliance process.
Prescott, supra note 21, at 726.
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Second, the realistic possibility standard is hardly a model of clarity,
despite its attempt to quantify the chance of success. 46  While tax
professionals, particularly lawyers, are called upon on a regular basis to
render opinions, written and oral, on whether particular return positions have
merit, nevertheless, predicting the degree of a position's success in court is
extremely difficult and certainly is not an exact science. If lawyers and other
tax professionals owe a duty to the tax system, doubts about aggressive
return positions should be resolved in favor of the government and thus
disclosed. If there is no such duty, legitimate doubts can be resolved in favor
of the client without disclosure.
It has been noted that "our tax system encourages aggressive tax
transactions [because] .... [o]ur tax system does not require that a taxpayer
resolve all uncertainties in favor of the government., 47 In fact, if the client
does not object to disclosure, the professional may recommend a position
that has less than a one-in-three chance of success,48 provided the position is
not frivolous.49
Third, if tax professionals owe a special duty to the tax system, there
appears to be considerable disagreement as to what that duty is. A recent
Wall Street Journal article noted that there is "little consensus among
government officials, consumer advocates, journalists, professional
organizations, and tax preparers from both small and large firms, about what
the extent and nature of' the role of the tax professional is in the voluntary
compliance system. 0
46. 1, and others, previously have discussed this point. See Watson, supra note 1, at 863-67
(explaining the realistic possibility standard and noting the "vast grey area of uncertainty" it leaves open);
Falk, supra note 17, at 654-55 (stating that various committees have "quibbled" over the proper
interpretation of the standard); Gould, supra note 34, at 537 (observing that lawyers disagree about the
standard's meaning). Consider the reasoning of Franklin L. Green, Exercising Judgment in the
Wonderland Gymnasium, TAX NOTES TODAY, March 19, 2001, LEXIS 2001 TNT 53-98, that most
disputes are settled and therefore the reference point for most tax practitioners in determining success is
not success in litigation, but rather success in settlement.
47. Gould, supra note 34, at 527.
48. See Gould, supra note 34, at 527 (stating that a taxpayer usually can avoid the assessment of an
accuracy-related penalty if the position "has at least a 10 percent or 15 percent likelihood of success and is
adequately disclosed.").
49. I.R.C § 6694(a).
50. Art Berkowitz & Richard Rampell, The Professional's Role in Providing Tax Services, WALL
ST. J. ONLINE, Jan. 21, 2003 (on file with author).
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Furthermore, state bar associations, which are the regulatory bodies of
practicing lawyers, seem unconcerned about whether lawyers have a duty to
the tax system. Instead, they leave the regulation of tax practitioners to the
federal government. Apparently, no state bar association has ever
disciplined a practitioner or even expressed concern over the conduct of a
tax practitioner related to the quality of tax advice.
51
The two most important problems for tax practitioners raised by
conforming the penalty standard to the ethical standard are (1) that a series
of preparer penalties may cause the IRS Director of Practice to conclude that
the practitioner has demonstrated a pattern of misconduct that could result in
the suspension or disbarment of that practitioner from practicing before the
52IRS, and (2) that the practitioner's reporting standard appears to be higher
than the taxpayer's reporting standard, which could result in a conflict of
interest between the practitioner and the client.
b. The Taxpayers' Standards
The accuracy-related penalty provision under the Internal Revenue Code
provides a civil penalty of 20% of the underpayment of tax required to be
shown on the taxpayer's return. 53  This provision encompasses several
specific penalties, including negligence, or disregard of the rules or
regulations, 54 and substantial understatements of income tax.
55
The negligence penalty will not apply if the position has at least a
reasonable basis.56  If the position does not have a reasonable basis,
51. See Watson, supra note 1, at 856 n.44 (citing James P. Holden, Practitioners' Standard of
Practice and the Taxpayer's Reporting Position, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 327, 337 (1991)).
52. See 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(b) (2002) (listing the standards for preparing or signing tax returns); see
also id. § 10.51(j) (listing conduct for which a tax practitioner can be disciplined). Congress intended the
Service to be judicious in its use of the ethical sanctions in connection with the preparer penalty. See H.R.
REP. No. 101-247, at 1396-97 (1989) ("The committee also intends that.., the IRS not generally expand
its investigations of preparer penalty cases."). This does not appear to have been the Service's policy,
however. See Watson, supra note 1, at 862 (stating that "[t]he imposition of the preparer penalty does not
necessarily involve the physical filing of a return or refund claim, nor does it necessarily require the
individual to sign the return or claim as a preparer."). For a criticism of the policy of imposing ethical
sanctions in an area that should be left to the civil penalty provisions, see Handelman, supra note 29, at 84
n.43.
53. I.R.C. § 6662. An underpayment is defined as "the amount by which any tax imposed ...
exceeds the excess of (1) the sum of (A) the amount shown as tax by the taxpayer on his return, plus (B)
amounts not so shown previously assessed (or collected without assessment), over (2) the amount of
rebates made." I.R.C. § 6664(a). For a general discussion of civil liability for understatements of tax
liability, see also supra note 19.
54. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(1).
55. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2).
56. I.R.C. § 6662(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(b)(1) (as amended in 1998).
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disclosure of the position will not insulate the taxpayer from the penalty,
although disclosure is an exception to the penalty for disregard of the rules
and regulations provided that the position represents a good faith challenge
to the rule or regulation.57 Disclosure of the position is only valid, however,
if it is made in accordance with the requirements of the regulations. 58 The
regulations clarify that the reasonable basis standard is "a relatively high
[one],. . . significantly higher than not frivolous or not patently improper." 59
It requires that a position be more than merely arguable or colorable. 60 But
the use of the reasonable basis standard has been called "unfortunate"
because of its "long and somewhat confusing history in the rules governing
the conduct of lawyers.'
If a taxpayer takes a position on a return that results in a substantial
understatement of income tax, the taxpayer will be subject to an
62
understatement penalty of 20% of the amount of the underpayment. The
taxpayer has two specific opportunities to avoid the penalty: (1) where the
taxpayer can establish that the position is supported by "substantial
authority, ' 63 and (2) where the position has a "reasonable basis," the
taxpayer took the position in good faith, and the taxpayer adequately
disclosed the position.64
If the taxpayer falls short of the standards that would enable her to avoid
an accuracy-related penalty, the taxpayer may avoid the penalty nonetheless
(either negligence or substantial understatement) if the taxpayer can establish
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-7(c) (as amended in 1998).
58. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
59. Treas. Reg. § 1.662-3(b)(3).
60. Id.
61. BERNARD WOLFMAN, ET AL., ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN FEDERALTAX PRACTICE 41 (3d ed. 1995);
see also Richard Stark, Let's Reconsider the 'Reasonable Basis' Standard, 59 TAX NOTES 1845, 1846-47
(1993) (urging a more concise standard).
62. I.R.C. § 6662(b)(2). A substantial understatement is an understatement for a taxable year that
exceeds the greater of 10% of the tax required to be shown on the return or $5,000 ($10,000 in the case of
a corporation that is not a Subchapter S corporation or personal holding company). Id. § 6662(d)(1).
Note that the penalty applies to the underpayment of tax that results from the understatement. See supra
note 19.
An understatement that is not substantial may be subject to the accuracy-related penalty
nonetheless, if the understatement results in an underpayment attributable to negligence or disregard of the
rules and regulations. I.R.C. § 6662 (b)(1). Note that the penalties cannot be "stacked;" therefore only a
single accuracy-related penalty will apply. Id. § 6662(a). Also, if the civil fraud penalty under § 6663
applies, the accuracy-related penalty does not apply to that portion of the understatement. Id. § 6662(b).
63. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(i).
64. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(B)(ii). Disclosure will not insulate the taxpayer from the assessment of a
negligence penalty, however. Id.
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65that she acted with "reasonable cause" and in good faith. The
determination of whether the taxpayer acted with reasonable cause and in
good faith is made on a case-by-case basis, taking all relevant facts and
circumstances into account. 66 One of the relevant circumstances is reliance
67on the advice of a competent professional.
In the case of understatements involving the use of tax shelters, 68 the
penalty is more difficult to avoid. For taxpayers other than corporations,
disclosure will not provide insulation against the assessment of the penalty.69
Taxpayers other than corporations may rely only on substantial authority,70
provided the taxpayer reasonably believed that the tax treatment of the item
was more likely than not proper.7' Corporate taxpayers may not rely on the
substantial authority exception. Instead, the only safe harbor protection
available for a corporate taxpayer is that of reasonable cause and good
faith.72
c. The Conflict Between the Standards
A practitioner must recommend disclosure of non-frivolous return
positions that do not pass the realistic possibility test. Violations of the
ethical standard could subject the practitioner to sanction or disbarment by
the Service.73
"Realistic possibility of success" generally is regarded as a higher
standard than "reasonable basis. 74 Thus, a tax practitioner who advises her
client to disclose a position that is not frivolous, but is questionable as to
65. Id. § 6664(c)(1).
66. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(b) (as amended in 1998).
67. Id. § 1.6664-4(c). This alone will not necessarily protect the taxpayer. Other factors also will be
considered, such as the reason(s) for entering into the transaction, and whether the taxpayer gave the
professional an accurate and complete statement of the facts. Id.
68. A tax shelter is defined as "(1) a partnership or other entity, (IT) any investment plan or
arrangement, or (IH) any other plan or arrangement, if a significant purpose of such partnership, entity,
plan, or arrangement is the avoidance or evasion of Federal income tax." I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(iii).
69. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i)(I).
70. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(i)(II).
71. Id.
72. Id. § 6662(d)(2)(C)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(e) (as amended in 1998).
73. 31 C.F.R. § 10.34(b), § 10.52 (2002).
74. Gould, supra note 34, at 536. However, the realistic possibility standard has been criticized as
being "functionally .... very close to the 'reasonable basis' standard that it replaces." Durst, supra note
44, at 1044; see also Gould, supra note 34, at 533 (discussing concerns raised over Formal Opinion 314
and noting that there have been suggestions that the reasonable basis standard was "simply a restatement
of the 'frivolousness' standard."). But, the legislative history of the accuracy-related penalties indicates
that the reasonable basis standard is a higher standard than "not frivolous." See H.R. REP. No. 103-213,
at 669 (1993) (stating that "the conferees intend that 'reasonable basis' be a relatively high standard of tax
reporting, that is, significantly higher than 'not patently improper."').
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whether it has a reasonable basis (i.e., the position is merely arguable or
colorable), will be insulating herself from liability, but will be exposing her
client to the risk of an accuracy-related penalty. If the position does not have
a reasonable basis, the disclosure will highlight the position while insulating
the preparer, but will place the client at risk of incurring the penalty.
On the other hand, if the return position has a reasonable basis, (but not
a realistic possibility of success) and it is not contrary to a rule or regulation,
nor will it result in a substantial understatement of tax, the taxpayer is
justified legally in taking the position without disclosure since it will not
subject her to an accuracy-related penalty. But according to the preparer's
penalty provision, as well as Circular 230, the preparer will be subject to
sanction and fine if she does not recommend that the taxpayer disclose the
position.75
Generally, the taxpayer will be unwilling to disclose a position which
she is legally entitled to take without disclosure, because the disclosure
required by the regulations almost guarantees an audit.76 Moreover, if the
practitioner estimates wrongly and it is subsequently determined that the
position does not have a reasonable basis, the disclosure will not insulate the
taxpayer from the negligence penalty.
If the understatement is substantial, the taxpayer may avoid the
accuracy-related penalty if the position has a reasonable basis and is
adequately disclosed in accordance with the regulations. If the position falls
short of the reasonable basis standard, disclosure will not insulate the
taxpayer from liability unless the "reasonable cause" defense applies. Again,
however, the practitioner is ethically obligated to recommend disclosure.
Another problem for the taxpayer is that the taxpayer has a right to
litigate disputes in the Tax Court prior to assessment or payment of the tax.77
Under the Tax Court Rules, taxpayers have the right to present any non-
75. I.R.C. § 6694(a); 31 C.F.R. § 10.52 (2002).
76. This is because of the type of disclosure required to be made. In general, the taxpayer must
attach a disclosure statement (Form 8275 or 8275-R) to the return, or disclose on the return itself
according to the applicable IRS specifications. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-4(f) (as amended in 1998). The
disclosure statement has been referred to as a "Please Audit Me Now" form. Prescott, supra note 21, at
753. The preparer's disclosure obligations depends upon the status of the preparer as signing or
nonsigning preparer. Treas. Reg. § 1.6694-2(c)(3) (as amended in 1992); Watson, supra note 1, at 861
n.70.
77. See I.R.C. § 6213(a) (stating that after a notice of deficiency is mailed to the taxpayer, the
taxpayer may file a petition to the Tax Court for a redetermination of the deficiency).
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frivolous position for which there is a "good faith argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law."78
If a taxpayer is entitled to litigate a good-faith, non-frivolous return
position, is it fair of Congress to impose a penalty on return positions that
meet this standard but do not meet the higher "reasonable basis" standard?
The discrepancy between the litigation standard and the penalty standard
could undermine disclosure, because if the taxpayer's return position is non-
frivolous but is determined to fall short of the reasonable basis standard, the
understatement penalty may be imposed regardless of whether or not the
position is disclosed. Since disclosure theoretically would not insulate the
taxpayer from the negligence penalty, the taxpayer may be less inclined
toward disclosure and more inclined to play the audit lottery if there is doubt
as to whether the reasonable basis standard has been met.79
A problem for the preparer is that the taxpayer will be motivated to seek
an opinion against disclosure by a tax practitioner as an insurance policy to
establish reasonable cause and good faith in order to avoid the accuracy-
related penalty.80 This presents a dilemma for the practitioner, who must
decide whether to risk a preparer's understatement penalty, and possible
sanction by the IRS Director of Practice, or to risk losing the client. This can
impose tremendous pressure on the practitioner, particularly if the
practitioner is a member of a law firm or accounting firm that is exerting
pressure on her to generate and maintain a lucrative client base.
On the other hand, if the practitioner incurs an understatement penalty,
this may cause the practitioner to be more risk averse in interpreting the
substantial authority standard, and thus to recommend disclosure when other
practitioners might not.8' If so, and the client objects to disclosure, there is a
82conflict of interest between the client and the practitioner.
The client also may not agree with the practitioner's quantification of the
position's chance of success. Whatever the reason, if the client and the
practitioner do not see eye-to-eye on the obligation to disclose an aggressive
return position, the client simply will go elsewhere and find a tax practitioner
whose view more closely corresponds to her own. The erosion of
78. TAX CT. R. PRAC. 33; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2002).
79. This tactic may not work as well for those taxpayers the Service identifies as at risk of cheating
on their taxes, such as those engaged in "abusive tax schemes," and employers who fail to file
employment tax returns and pay their employment tax liability. Under the new National Research
Program (NRP) audits, the Service hopes to boost the audit rates of these taxpayers by 72%. See Rob
Wells, IRS to Boost Audits of Corporate, Individual Tax Cheats, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 1, 2003 (on
file with author); see also infra notes 131-33, and accompanying text (discussing the NRP audits).
80. I.R.C. § 6664(c); Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1).
81. Watson, supra note 1, at 865-67.
82. Id.
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professional ethical standards because of the fear of losing clients or because
of the pressure to attract clients has been borne out recently in the highly
publicized downfall of one of the oldest and most venerable of the big
accounting firms, Arthur Andersen.
83
If there is a discrete duty to the tax system, the public's interest in
ensuring that the federal tax system operates efficiently and fairly should be
paramount, and questionable positions ideally should be resolved in favor of
the government. Doubtless, there are some practitioners with very high
standards who operate under this assumption. But this certainly is not true
across the board.84
B. Do the Accuracy-Related Penalties Establish a Normative Standard?
Do the accuracy-related penalties establish a normative standard to
which lawyers and other tax practitioners must adhere, or do they merely
constitute the operational cost of risking an undisclosed, aggressive return
position? If lawyers and other tax practitioners owe an affirmative duty to
the tax system, it should be clear that the civil penalties do indeed establish a
normative standard. But this very question has been debated at length
85
among tax scholars with no definitive answer to date.
Germane to this discussion is whether the obligation to disclose
aggressive return positions, in particular, represents a normative requirement
or whether it is simply a means to avoid a public fee designed to limit
83. See, e.g., Ken Brown and Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen's Fallfrom Grace Is a
Tale of Greed and Miscues, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2002, at A l (chronicling the rise and fall of the "Big
Five" accounting firm); Ken Brown and Jonathan Weil, Questioning the Books: How Andersen's
Embrace of Consulting Altered the Culture of the Auditing Firm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 2002, at C l
(discussing rise of consulting business and the problems it caused with the Arthur Andersen firm).
84. For example, consider the following statement of the ABA Task Force in commenting on Formal
Opinion 85-352:
Doubtless there were some tax practitioners who intended "reasonable basis" to set a relatively
high standard of tax reporting. Some have continued to apply such a standard. To more,
however, if not most tax practitioners, the ethical standard set by reasonable basis" had
become a low one. To many it had come to permit any colorable claim to be put forth; to
permit almost any words that could be strung together to be used to support a tax return
position.
Sax et al., supra note 28, at 638.
85. See, e.g., Durst, supra note 44, at 1065-75 (discussing the reluctance among practitioners to
classify the penalty as a normative standard); Gould, supra note 34, at 532 ("[l1t is far from clear that this
penalty establishes a normative standard for taxpayer conduct."); Prescott, supra note 21, at 751-54
(arguing for a "normative obligation").
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aggressive return positions to "a socially optimal level."86 If it is the latter,
the taxpayer in her discretion simply may opt for nondisclosure if the
benefits of nondisclosure exceed the costs of the penalty.
87
If, however, the taxpayer's standard for disclosure is normative, a tax
advisor would have a firm duty to recommend disclosure whenever a return
position is not supported by substantial authority. But the "realistic
possibility" disclosure standard applicable to practitioners, falls somewhere
below the substantial authority standard but above the "reasonable basis"
88standard. The discrepancy has been explained as necessary to allow the
practitioner flexibility in advising a return position that has a feasible chance
of success but which cannot meet the substantial authority standard.89 The
problem, however, is that the Service does not recognize some authority that
practitioners may regard as substantial, such as treatises and law review
articles. Yet these sources have been and continue to be cited by the courts.
For this reason, the ABA, in reconsidering Formal Opinion 314, refused to
endorse the use of "substantial authority" as the prevailing ethical disclosure
standard for lawyers recommending aggressive return positions.
90
The Service also does not regard legal opinions as substantial authority,
and one can see why. But if there is no other authority available, the well-
reasoned opinion of an independent, competent professional should suffice.9'
Civil penalties generally should be regarded as normative and should
play an important role in encouraging taxpayers to comply fully with the
voluntary compliance system. 92 But the fact that the practitioner's disclosure
standard differs from the taxpayer's disclosure standard, in a manner that
86. Durst, supra note 44, at 1061.
87. Id. at 1061-62.
88. Arguably, the "realistic possibility" standard does not fall significantly above the "reasonable
basis" standard of the former substantial understatement penalty provision. Id. at 1044-45. But see
Richard C. Stark, A Principled Approach to Collection and Accuracy-Related Penalties, 91 TAX NOTES
115, 144 (2001) (noting that it does not matter what the standard is because the boundaries will be
determined by the courts).
89. Durst, supra note 34, at 1042-43.
90. See Durst, supra note 34, at 1041-42 (discussing the Tax Section of the ABA's attempt "to
establish a standard more demanding than 'reasonable basis' but less demanding than 'substantial
authority"'). At the time of the ABA's consideration of the substantial authority standard, the Service did
not consider private letter rulings to be substantial authority. The Service since then has changed its
position and now includes private letter rulings on its list of what constitutes substantial authority. Treas.
Reg. § 1.6662-4(d)(3)(iv) (as amended in 1998).
91. This is the suggestion of the Tax Council, a Washington, D.C.-based group of senior tax
executives, commenting on the pending Tax Shelter Disclosure Act legislation. See Beckett G. Cantley,
The Tax Shelter Disclosure Act: The Next Battle in the Tax Shelter War, 22 VA. TAX REV. 105, 123-24
(2002).
92. Stark, supra note 88, at 122.
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raises conflicts of interest between the practitioner and the client, indicates
that the standard is not a normative one.
The strongest argument, however, against the accuracy-related penalties
establishing a normative standard is that the Service apparently has failed to
fully enforce the penalties in the past, despite its successes in court when the
penalties have been challenged.93 While it has been speculated that perhaps
few taxpayers meet the criteria for the penalties, recent reports of challenges
to overly aggressive tax avoidance schemes that have been reported almost
daily in newspapers across the country suggest this is not the case. What is
more likely to be the case is that the taxpayers who potentially are subject to
these penalties are the more sophisticated, upper-income taxpayers who have
more at stake and can better afford to litigate the imprecise boundaries of the
standards. 94 Since these penalties are likely to be imposed only after an
audit, which itself is resource-intensive, the Service may be more inclined to
settle the issue in order to conclude the audit and to avoid protracted
litigation.
C. Is a Tax Audit an Adversarial Proceeding?
Since 1985 when Formal Opinion 85-352 was issued, the ABA has
neither withdrawn the opinion nor further clarified it. Therefore, the formal
position of the ABA is that all dealings between lawyers and the Service are
adversarial. If this is the case, what duty, if any, does the lawyer owe to the
tax system?
In the preparation and filing of a tax return, a tax practitioner usually
will have minimal, if any, direct contact with the government. This is not
the case with an audit. Commentators have argued that the voluntary
compliance system requires "a cooperative effort between taxpayers and the
government" that is seriously undermined when "taxpayers and tax lawyers
... treat the return preparation and examination process as an adversarial
proceeding in which vigorous advocacy of positions will produce a winner
and a loser.,
95
93. See id., at 138-40 (discussing the sporadic enforcement of accuracy-related penalties).
94. See George Guttman, Rossotti's Thoughts On the IRS and the Tax System, 96 TAX NOTES 1822,
1823 (2002) (Commissioner Rossotti notes that "[tlhe IRS tends to turn a blind eye to [the exotic tax
avoidance schemes of the rich] because the rich have the cream of the tax intelligentsia defending them
while most auditors lack the skills to identify complicated tax structures .... Historically, the IRS has
focused on individual tax returns rather than passthrough entities because the latter pay no taxes.").
95. Prescott, supra note 21, at 769.
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While most tax practitioners and scholars seem to be in agreement that
96the filing of a tax return should not be regarded as adversarial, there
remains some disagreement about the status of a tax audit.97 Some
commentators have argued that audits are merely measurements of
taxpayers' compliance efforts and thus are not adversarial in nature. Other
commentators, however, disagree.98
It has been argued further that the Service is not the formidable enforcer
of the tax laws that it once was and, therefore, in the interest of the tax
system, taxpayers and practitioners alike owe a greater duty of disclosure to
the Service.99 This statement is borne out in the audit statistics. While
ideally the rate of audit in a voluntary compliance system should be low,
nevertheless, the Service's audit statistics have been extremely low, with the
audit rates declining each year since 1995. 10 The Service primarily blames
the low rates on a lack of resources and personnel to devote to compliance
enforcement.' 0 ' Therefore, it has been argued that the low audit rate
indicates that it is no longer a level playing field for the Service. t°2
On the other side of the coin, though, is the fact that in an audit a
revenue agent is representing the government. Given recent publicity about
how the Service believes that it has been squandering its scarce resources
because a large number of audits have resulted in no changes,103 the
implication is that returns will be selected on the basis that they have a
greater potential for adjustment. Thus, taxpayers and their representatives
96. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (citing criticism of the characterization of the return
process as adversarial).
97. Falk, supra note 17, at 647; Prescott, supra note 21, at 723-27.
98. See Gould, supra note 34, at 529-30 (discussing the adversarial elements of the self-assessment
obligation).
99. See Prescott, supra note 21, at 736-41 (discussing the tax compliance system and the job of the
examining agent).
100. In fiscal year 2001. more than 168 million returns were filed, and slightly more than 815,000
returns were examined. This represents an audit rate of 0.48%. LNTERNAL REVENUE SERV., lNTERNAL
REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK 2001 at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/oldatabk.pdf (Mar. 2002). This rate
has been relatively steady since 1998. See Stark, supra note 88, at 119 (also noting that in 1965, the audit
rate exceeded 6%).
101. See Charles 0. Rossotti, Report to the IRS Oversight Board-Assessment of the IRS and the Tax
System, TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 25, 2002, at l 7. 70. LEXIS 2002 TNT 186-17 (stating that IRS is
"winning the battle but losing the war" against tax cheats in part because of "steady decline in IRS
resources due to budget constraints").
102. See Prescott, supra note 2 1, at 736-41 (discussing the adversarial process of the tax compliance
system).
103. See Tom Herman, Unhappy Returns: IRS Moves to Bring Back Random Audits, WALL ST. J.,
June 20, 2002, at A I (noting that the no-change rate for 1998 was 24.4%, up from 19.3% in 1994); David
Cay Johnston, Hunting Tax Cheats, I.R.S. Vows to Focus More Effort on the Rich, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13,
2002, at A l (reporting on the IRS's new policy targeting wealthy taxpayers).
1216 [Vol. 51
HeinOnline  -- 51 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1216 2002-2003
Legislating Morality
know going into the audit that there is a great likelihood that some items on
the returns will be challenged.
There is no provision that requires a taxpayer to voluntarily disclose
information once the return has been filed. Moreover, an attorney
representing a taxpayer at an audit may be prohibited from disclosing
weaknesses in the client's case under the rules of professional responsibility
of the state bar association in which the attorney is licensed to practice.104
The practitioner further may be motivated to avoid voluntarily disclosing
information in an audit if the practitioner recommended an aggressive return
position or tax avoidance scheme that was not disclosed. Thus, if the
practitioner is at risk of incurring a preparer penalty or an ethical sanction
under Circular 230, the practitioner will have a personal interest in not
disclosing information.
Another indication that a tax audit is an adversarial process is that once a
return is selected for examination, the deck generally is stacked in favor of
the Service. It has specially trained agents, it often has the advantage over
the taxpayer of knowing exactly what is in question while the taxpayer does
not, and it has a variety of procedural devices that it may use to compel
testimony, or production of books and records. °5 In addition, an
uncooperative taxpayer is disadvantaged in any subsequent judicial
proceeding because the shift in burden of proof from the Service to the
taxpayer in civil trials, implemented under RRA '98, does not apply.'0 6 The
existence of this provision is itself an indication that Congress considered
litigation in the post-return filing process a very real possibility.
Most importantly, however, is the fact that a routine examination can
become a criminal investigation. °7 While this is rare, the problem is that
there is often a very fine line between mere negligence, civil fraud, and
criminal fraud. 10 8 Thus, an agent's discretion often may be required to
discern the difference. In a criminal investigation, the attorney should regard
the rights of the taxpayer/client as paramount.
104. See Watson, supra note 1, at 871-91, for a discussion of the obligation of a tax attorney in
representing a taxpayer at an audit.
105. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 7602 (providing for administrative summons to examine books and records);
I.R.C. § 7609 (providing for third party summons); I.R.C. § 7606 (providing for authority to enter
premises).
106. See I.R.C. § 7491 (providing for shifting the burden of proof).
107. See U.S. v. McKee, 192 F.3d 535, 537 (6th Cir. 1999) (discussing the fact that the dividing line
between a civil audit and a criminal investigation is not always discernable).
108. This involves the subjective determinations of what constitutes reckless, intentional, and willful
disregard of the rules and regulations.
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In a routine civil audit, the examination is conducted by a revenue agent.
In a criminal investigation, the examination is conducted by a special agent,
who must identify himself as such to the target, must explain that his
purpose is to investigate crimes, and must give the target a modified
Miranda warning. 109 When a revenue agent has a "firm indication" of fraud,
he must refer the case to the Criminal Investigation Division." 0 The special
agent (and perhaps the revenue agent) is required under the Internal Revenue
Manual to give the taxpayer a modified Miranda warning so that the
taxpayer may preserve his or her constitutional rights. 11 Relatively recently,
however, the Seventh Circuit has held that a criminal tax investigation is not
considered custodial, so "the Miranda rule is not in play."' 1 2 The taxpayers
in that case made incriminating statements that were used against them at
trial. On appeal, they argued that the statements should have been
inadmissible because the IRS agent represented that the audit was civil rather
than criminal, and thus their cooperation was obtained by trickery and
deceit. 1 3 Writing for the majority, Judge Posner, dismissed the taxpayer's
argument, stating that "trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a
confession inadmissible, ... unless government agents make threats or
• ,114
promises.
Although at the present time this view is held only by the Seventh
Circuit, nevertheless, it has been suggested that if this position is adopted by
other courts, taxpayers and tax practitioners will be well advised not to
cooperate with the Service if there is "even the slightest possibility of the
investigation turning criminal."'"15  So far, the Service has given no
indication of changing its manual to reflect the position of the Seventh
Circuit. But a general undermining of basic taxpayer rights will be
detrimental to the voluntary compliance system in the long run.
109. INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) § 9.4.5.11.3.1.1 (2002).
110. See id. § 25.1.3.1. For a discussion of what constitutes a "firm indication" of fraud, see United
States v. Foster, No. 01-80264, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12341, at *10--12 (E.D. Mich. July 1, 2002)
(explaining that the agent must examine all facts and circumstances, and must distinguish "firm
indication" from "first indication").
111. See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL (CCH) § 9.4.5.11.3.1.1 (2002): see also Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976) (concluding that the special agent must recite administrative warning
prior to soliciting information).
112. United States v. Kontny, 238 F.3d 815, 817 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 1022 (2001).
113. Id.
114. Id. For a criticism of the Kontny decision, see John A. Townsend. Taxpayer Rights in Criminal
Investigations, 90 TAX NOTES 1842, 1844-47 (2001). Townsend also notes that in the Seventh Circuit, at
least, it is unclear whether the Service can unreasonably delay referring the case to the DOJ in order to use
the administrative summons to collect evidence against the taxpayer. Id. at 1847.
115. Id. at 1846. Townsend notes that this "would be virtually every audit, unless the practitioner has
conducted a fraud potential audit prior to undertaking the civil audit representation." Id. But most clients
will not be willing to pay for the extra time involved in conducting the fraud potential audit.
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Ill. THE IRS RESTRUCTURING AND REFORM ACT OF 1998
In the past, taxpayers have complained that the Service has not always
been fair and even-handed in exercising its discretion and in enforcing the
law. In 1996, the Republican controlled House began holding hearings on
IRS abuse of taxpayers. These hearings generated much negative publicity
for the Service, painting a picture of a governmental agency out of control."16
Compounding the negative publicity of the hearings was the further negative
publicity over the expensive failure of the Service's modernization efforts. 7
Without a constituency to support it, and without being able to adequately
defend itself in the hearings because of its statutorily imposed duty of
confidentiality," 8 the result was the enactment of RRA '98.119
RRA '98 was not the first reform effort of its kind. In fact, it is the
fourth time in 139 years that there has been a powerful, committed reform
drive, although in the interim the Service has been renamed, restructured and
repeatedly rebuilt. 2 0 The four major reform efforts have had three factors in
common. First, each was instigated by Congress following critical reports
from ad hoc commissions. All of the commissions had a common refrain:
the Service was beset by administrative inefficiency, corruption, taxpayer
abuse, and personnel problems.12  Second, the reform efforts all came at a
time when the political environment was turning more conservative, and
more importantly, when public sentiment was turning against progressive
taxation. 122  Third, general administrative failures of the Service lent a
legitimacy and urgency to the reforms. The first three reform efforts
followed on the heels of war, which prompted sweeping changes in the tax
system that highlighted collection problems in all of the cases. The fourth
and last reform effort in 1998 was prompted in large part by the failures of
116. See Lott's Statement at Ceremony Marking Passage of IRS Reform Bill, TAX NOTES TODAY,
July 21, 1998, LEXIS 98 TNT 140-23 (discussing IRS abuse of taxpayers).
117. For a general discussion of the negative publicity problem, as well as a discussion of problems
that the failure to modernize is currently causing, see George Guttman, Is the IRS Failing at
Modernization, Again?. 87 TAX NOTES 1192 (2000).
118. See I.R.C. § 6103.
119. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat.
730.
120. See generally Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative
History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717 (2001) (discussing the history of Internal Revenue Service reform).
121. Id. at 717-19.
122. It was no accident, for example, that the Clinton White House expressed serious concerns about
the Restructuring Commission's report while the Republican controlled House of Representatives
enthusiastically embraced it. See id. at 773 (commenting on the Restructuring Commission's report).
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the Service's modernization efforts. This latest reform effort is interesting
because the Service was ordered to restructure itself and to change its
ideology from collections to taxpayer service. This was a very tall order for
the Service and it has meant that resources previously dedicated to
compliance have had to be redirected toward meeting the Congressional
restructuring and reform mandate.
Several recent reports have focused on the precipitously sharp declines
in IRS compliance and collection programs over the past few years since the
passage of RRA '98.123 These reports have raised troubling questions about
the impact of the declines on the tax system as a whole. In a survey
conducted in the summer of 2002, nearly one-fourth of taxpayers (24%)
thought it was acceptable to cheat on their income taxes. 12 4 But in a similar
survey conducted in 1999, only 13% of taxpayers indicated that they thought
this was acceptable behavior.1
25
Ironically, these figures follow on the heels of the best report card the
Service has received in approximately twenty years. 126 What has prompted
this shift? Is there truly a decline in enforcement of the tax laws and if so,
what has caused it?
A. Compliance and Enforcement Activities
The federal tax system is extremely important to this country because it
provides revenues that fund most of the operating budget of the federal
government. 127 But paradoxically, while the system operates under the
principle of voluntary compliance, the federal tax laws are so complex that
even most professionals have trouble comprehending them.
It is no accident that both the current and former National Taxpayer
Advocates have identified the complexity of the tax code as the most serious
problem facing business and individual taxpayers.' 28 This complexity costs
123. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Departing Chief Says I.R.S. Is Losing Its War on Tax Cheats,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at Al: The Taxman, Outgunned, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2002, at A18:
Constance Parten, GAO Study Indicates "Pervasive" Declines in IRS Compliance and Collection
Programs, DAILY TAX REP., June 26, 2002, at G-3. But see Grassley Questions Accuracy ofIRS Audit
Rates, 91 TAX NOTES 159 (2001) (stating that the audit numbers fail to reflect the millions of "invisible
audits" that are not face-to-face).
124. See Tom Herman, IRS Tackles Thorny Tax Issues Involving Churches and Politics, WALL ST. J..
July 11, 2002, at D2.
125. Id.
126. See George Guttman. Taxpayer Satisfaction with the IRS, 90 TAX NOTES 144, 144-45 (2001)
(discussing improved taxpayer responses to the IRS).
127. Approximately 95% of the operating budget of the federal government comes from tax revenues.
George Guttman, The IRS's Fiscal 2004 Budget: More or Less?, 98 TAX NOTES 486, 487 (2003).
128. See Joint Comm. on Taxation, JCT Reports on Progress in IRS Reform, TAX NOTES TODAY,
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the American public an astonishing amount each year, which includes the
amount of the tax gap (the difference between the amount owed if the laws
were properly applied and the amount actually collected)129 and the cost of
compliance (i.e., the amount Americans spend yearly on professional advice,
tax preparation software, and return preparation). 30
The complexity of the tax code is a major problem for the Service as
well because it imposes a substantial burden upon the government to insure
that taxpayers are filing correct returns. Taxpayers have flexibility to resolve
issues on their tax returns to their advantage and sophisticated taxpayers are
frequently able to devise methods of utilizing ambiguities in the law to their
further advantage. In order to keep pace with these increasingly
sophisticated taxpayers, as well as increasingly sophisticated technology,
revenue agents themselves must become more knowledgeable and
sophisticated.
Some of the complexity in the tax code is necessary to promote its varied
sociopolitical goals, such as social welfare under the earned income tax
credit, retirement savings, and the encouragement of education. But some of
the complexity is unwarranted under any set of goals,' 3' and all of these
May 14, 2002. at 234. LEXIS 2002 TNT 93-18 (statement of Nina Olson); Senate Finance Comm.,
Unofficial Transcript of Finance Committee Hearing on IRS Reform. TAX NOTES TODAY. Feb. 10, 2000,
at 93, LEXIS 2002 TNT 28-40 (statement of Val Oveson).
129. The tax gap for 1998 was estimated to be $275 billion attributable to income and employment
taxes, of which only $50 billion is considered collectible. This gap amounted to over 15% of the total tax
due for that year. IRS Paper on Impact of IRS on Voluntary Tax Compliance, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov.
20, 2002, at 4, LEXIS 2002 TNT 224-22. Needless to say, if this amount were collected, our tax rates
probably would be lower.
130. The estimated compliance figures vary widely depending upon whose study they are based upon.
According to the Cato Institute. the estimated cost to taxpayers of the record-keeping and filing burdens is
between $150 billion to $300 billion per year. David R. Burton, Cato Institute Analyzes Reformng
Federal Tax Policy Process, TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 18. 2002, at 8, LEXIS 2002 TNT 243-45. The
government, on the other hand, estimates compliance costs to be over $16 billion annually, with over $3
billion taxpayer hours spent per year on tax compliance. Thomas F. Field, IRS Develops Model to
Measure Taxpayer Compliance Burden, TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 19, 2002. at I. LEXIS 2002 TNT 223-
5. If the cost in dollars of taxpayer hours spent on compliance were included, however, the two sets of
figures may not be very far apart. Conversation with Mark J. Mazur. Director of Research, Analysis, and
Statistics, Internal Revenue Service, in Lawrence, Kan. (Mar. 6. 2003).
131. For instance, the complexity of the tax code is exemplified by the current capital gains rate
structure with its myriad sets of rates and holding periods. Another example is the phase-out of many tax
benefits that affects taxpayers when their income reaches a target level. Benefits such as itemized
deductions and personal exemptions are reduced or eliminated after a taxpayer's adjusted gross income
exceeds the target level which varies according to the phase-out. Not only do the phase-outs further
complicate an already complex set of laws, but it also means that many taxpayers will not be able to easily
estimate the effect of their itemized deductions and personal exemptions on their tax liability. This
uncertainty ensures that these taxpayers will have to seek professional help in preparing their tax returns.
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systems must be overseen by the Service, in addition to its primary
responsibility of collecting revenue, ensuring adequate compliance with the
tax laws, and increasing taxpayer satisfaction.
When the complexity of the tax code is combined with taxpayers'
general loathing of the Service, this does not bode well for compliance
efforts, and no doubt contributes to the widening tax gap. The problem for
the Service is primarily one of public perception and this problem is multi-
faceted. First and foremost is the fact that the Service has no constituency.
Despite the "kinder, gentler IRS," with its focus on taxpayer service, the fact
is no one enjoys paying taxes. This duty becomes even more distasteful
when it is combined with the fear of a tax audit with its intrusiveness,
expense, inconvenience, and the ever-present threat of stiff civil penalties or
worse yet, criminal penalties and/or prosecution. The deterrence factor of a
potential criminal prosecution may be a double-edged sword for the Service
because it reinforces the ABA's contention that the mere filing of a tax
return constitutes "the first step in a process that may result in an adversarial
relationship between the client and the IRS."'' 32 This lends credence to the
ABA's position that the taxpayers' dealings with the IRS are adversarial.
Second, the complexity of the tax laws exacerbates the high costs of
compliance. Many of the public tend to equate compliance (and thus
complexity) with the Service. This raises two current problems for the
Service. First, in order to measure compliance and adequately enforce the
tax laws, it must periodically engage in calibration audits. Previously, these
audits were very intrusive, time-consuming, expensive, and stressful for
taxpayers. The tax bar had voiced strong objections to them because of their
resemblance to criminal investigations without the concomitant
constitutional safeguards. Despite assurances that the new National
Research Program (NRP) audits will be less intrusive than the former
compliance audits, the commencement of these new compliance audits is
bound to cause anxiety among taxpayers because the fact is a tax audit is
This is particularly egregious when one considers that phase-outs are a game that Congress plays to avoid
the political suicide of raising tax rates directly.
Another example of the complexity of the tax code is the alternative minimum tax (AMT). This
is an additional tax liability that originally was designed to deter high-income individuals from investing
most of their income in tax-exempt investments, thereby avoiding their fair share of tax. But recently, the
AMT has operated to impose an additional tax on middle-income taxpayers who least suspect the trap.
The problem of the unfairness of the AMT has been commented upon at length, but Congress so far has
failed to heed the complaints and is unlikely to do so in the near future because there has not been enough
of a public outcry about this inequity and because the AMT generates a substantial amount of revenue.
See Karen Hube, Tax Trap: More Retirees Are Getting Hit with the Dreaded Alternative Minimum Tax.
Here's How to Soften the Blow, WALL ST. J., Sept. 30, 2002, at R5 (explaining the alternative minimum
tax).
132. Formal Op. 85-352, supra note 24, at 460.
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unpleasant under any circumstances. Even the chair of the Senate Finance
Committee has weighed in on this issue, equating a tax audit to "an
accountant's version of a root canal". 133 It remains to be seen what effect the
NRP audits will have on the Service's public image. Second, the alternative
minimum tax, 34 which originally was designed to counteract tax avoidance
schemes of the rich, has not been indexed and now affects middle-income
taxpayers and retirees. This additional tax may be imposed when taxpayers
have no corresponding cash flow with which to pay the tax liability, and this
is perceived as extremely unfair. The public perception of the fairness of the
tax laws in general, and the Service in particular, is crucial to the voluntary
compliance system. This is a phenomenon with which Congress is very
familiar, yet it refuses to take action to adjust the alternative minimum tax so
that it operates in a fair manner. The public perception problem may
exacerbate another large problem facing the Service, which is funding. The
Service recently has complained that it has not received sufficient funding to
adequately conform to the requirements of RRA '98 while simultaneously
enforcing the tax laws, and that this has greatly hindered its collection
efforts. 135 Former IRS Commissioner Charles Rossotti said in his departing
speech that "the agency is steadily losing the war with tax cheats, especially
the wealthiest and most sophisticated among them.' 136  James White,
director of tax issues at the General Accounting Office (GAO), has
commented understandably that this "might make the rest of us nervous
about whether everyone is paying their fair share."'
137
133. See Amy Hamilton, 'Taxpayer Beware': Grassley to Highlight Rip-Offs, 91 TAX NOTES 27, 27
(2001) (quoting Senator Charles E. Grassley as saying, "I believe it is possible to obtain such taxpayer
compliance information without subjecting individual taxpayers to an accountant's version of root
canal.").
134. See I.R.C. §§ 55-59 (explaining alternative minimum tax and its application); see also supra
note 131 (discussing the AMT).
135. Before Commissioner Rossotti left office, he issued a "grave warning" to lawmakers about the
critical need for adequate funding in order to enable the Service to carry out its enforcement activities.
Larry Levitan, chair of the IRS Oversight Board, reiterated this warning at a congressional hearing in May
2002, stating that if Congress did not appropriate more money to the IRS than the Bush budget called for,
there would be no increase in compliance efforts. Amy Hamilton, IRS's Budget Tightrope Turns into a
Noose. 97 TAX NOTES 1263, 1263 (2002). The Service's auditing staff has shrunk by 20% since 1995,
while the number of tax returns filed has increased by 13%. According to the New York Times, "[Tihe
Bush administration insists, unconvincingly, that its nominal increases to the I.R.S. budget, coupled with
its efforts to simplify the tax code, should enable the agency to carry out its mission." The Taxman,
Outgunned. supra note 123.
136. Johnston, supra note 6, at Al.
137. John D. McKinnon, IRS Grows Lax in Tax Collection, A Report Shows, WALL ST. J., June 26,
2002, at A5 (statement of James White, director of tax issues, GAO).
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There is considerable justification for this nervousness since according
to a report issued last year by the GAO, the number of non-filers "seems to
have increased about three-and-a-half times faster than the tax-filing
population as a whole."' 38 Apparently, many taxpayers have concluded that
a hobbled IRS cannot catch them, and they may be on to something because
the Service has admitted that it has not even tried to collect payment from
approximately 1.3 million taxpayers who collectively owe some $16
billion. 139
The Bush administration has disputed former Commissioner Rossotti's
statement that the Service is underfunded, without offering any data or
explanation of how the Service is wasting its resources, not applying these
resources adequately, or not doing its job properly. 14  But then, what
political gain does any politician derive from supporting the IRS? If the
Bush administration recommended appropriating more money to the Service,
and Congress were to act on this recommendation, the upshot would be
stronger enforcement efforts by the Service. The taxpayers most likely to be
affected by this are the higher-income taxpayers, many of whom supported
the current administration. 14 The increased enforcement efforts would more
than likely trigger complaints to Congress once again of further taxpayer
abuse. So the funding problem becomes a vicious circle.
But the problem is not solely one of funding. In RRA '98, it is clear that
Congress issued a public rebuke to the Service. Maybe this was valid in
some respects, but the overall tone of the legislation showed a distinct lack
of regard for the agency. For instance, the shift in the burden of proof from
the taxpayer to the Service in civil cases,14 2 a new oversight Board of
Directors,143 and the list of "10 deadly sins," the infraction of any one of
which could result in Service employees losing their jobs,'44 clearly make
this point.
138. Id.
139. MeKinnon. supra note 137. at A5.
140. The fact that President Bush has selected Mark W. Everson, an accountant and former corporate
executive known for improving performance and cutting costs, to succeed Commissioner Rossotti is an
indication that the Service is expected to rein in its expenses and become more efficient. See Richard W.
Stevenson, Budget Official Is Bush's Choice To Lead an Embattled I.R.S., N.Y. TIMES. Jan. 14. 2003, at
C8 (explaining that the Bush administration chose Everson because the Service needs "management help
more than tax-policy expertise."). This may not bode well for its funding prospects.
141. This is the view of former IRS Commissioner, Donald Alexander. George Guttman, News
Analysis: The IRS's Fiscal 2004 Budget: More or Less?, 98 TAx NOTES 486. 487-88 (2003).
142. Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206. § 2001.
112 Stat. at 726-27 (adding § 7491 to Internal Revenue Code).
143. § 101(a), 112 Stat. at 691-97 (creating nine member oversight board).
144. See infra notes 145-46 and accompanying text (explaining that the risk of losing their jobs
causes Service employees to cool enforcement efforts).
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In addition to the lack of resources, another problem that has been raised
as contributing to the low audit rate is the list of "10 deadly sins" under RRA
'98.145 The problem is that the "sins" are ill-conceived and poorly drafted,
so that taxpayer complaints could result in a revenue agent losing his job.
Thus, some speculate that agents avoid pushing examination issues to the
extent that they could for fear of retaliation by the taxpayers under
examination, particularly the more sophisticated taxpayers. This may
explain why so few accuracy-related penalties have been imposed. 146
The failure to appoint a replacement for outgoing Commissioner
Rossotti until late in the budget process is another example of the political
disdain in which the Bush administration holds the Service. 147  When
respected public figures call the tax code "a disgrace to the human race,"
48
and conservatives claim that they will "get rid of the IRS,' 49 this
undermines public confidence in the Service in particular and the tax system
in general.
IV. WHAT HAS CAUSED THE RECENT SPATE OF CORPORATE SCANDALS?
Recently, we have witnessed an explosion of abusive tax avoidance
"schemes, scams and cons,"' 50 and a corresponding implosion of standards
of professional conduct. From Enron to WorldCom to Global Crossing, the
abusive transactions in which these companies have engaged, and the public
scandals that have resulted have undermined the confidence of investors in
the stock market, which in turn has had a devastating effect on the national
145. § 1203, 112 Stat. at 720-22 (uncodified). For a criticism of these provisions, see Ann Murphy &
David Higer, The 10 Deadly Sins: A Law with Unintended Consequences, 96 TAX NOTES 871, 874
(2002) (calling the law unnecessary); Amy Hamilton, Ten Deadly Sins: Effective Tool or Invitation to
Employee Harassment?, 85 TAX NOTES 1360, 1362-63 (1999) (criticizing the Act for discouraging
enforcement and collection efforts).
146. See supra notes 94-95, and accompanying text (explaining that the more sophisticated taxpayers
are better prepared and more likely to litigate).
147. See Amy Hamilton, No Word on New IRS Commissioner, 97 TAX NOTES 732, 732 (2002)
(characterizing the situation as "weird" that Commissioner Rosotti left without word of replacement).
148. See Jeffrey L. Yablon, As Certain As Death-Quotations About Taxes, 95 TAX NOTES 395, 398
(2002) (statement of Jimmy Carter).
149. See Molly Ivins, Rich People and Their Level of Greed, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 13, 2003, at 23
(characterizing the Act as a Republican maneuver to "hamstring the IRS so it can't make rich people pay
what they owe").
150. The Senate Finance Committee has been holding hearings since Spring 2002 on antitax
"schemes, scams, and cons," in an effort to combat tax evasion which costs the federal government
billions of dollars each year. See Finance Staff Memo Outlines Hearing on Tay Scams, 95 TAX NOTES
214, 214 (2002) (describing the Finance Committee's hearing topic).
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economy. Moreover, there appears to be no end to the scandals involving
abusive tax avoidance transactions.' 
5
There are several factors that contributed to the current spate of scandals,
and with hindsight, the resulting scandals should have been predictable.
First, it is no accident that all of the major accounting firms were involved in
these transactions. After the merger of the big accounting firms in the 1980s
and 1990s, the resulting mega-firms became money "'monster[s] that needed
to be fed."" 5 2  The explosion of the Enron scandal and the resulting
downfall of the "Big Five" accounting firm, Arthur Andersen, revealed the
intense internal pressure generated by the tremendous competition between
the auditing group and the consulting group within Andersen to bring in
large clients and vast amounts of income to the firm. With the decline in
audit rates, the firms began to look to other sources of income, and it found
profit in marketing highly aggressive tax avoidance proposals.
Second, in 1991, the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
(AICPA) changed its rules to allow accountants to charge performance-
based fees instead of hourly rates and fixed fees. 153  As a result, the
accounting firms have received hundreds of millions of dollars in fees from
marketing these aggressive tax avoidance proposals, as have the law firms
that provided the necessary opinion letters for the transactions.
The large amount of income generated from these transactions is itself a
contributing problem, because other firms (both accounting firms and law
firms) that perceived no negative consequences from marketing these
abusive tax transactions have been motivated to cash in as well. In doing so,
these firms ignored a basic fact, which is that it generally takes several years
before the Service discovers aggressive or abusive transactions, particularly
where no disclosure is made at the time of the transaction. Thus, there has
been a delay in negative consequences from the inception of the abusive
transaction to today, when scandals seem to surface on a regular basis.
The third factor is that the transactions occurred during a period of
strong economic growth when investors had more income to shelter, and
during the downturn immediately following the economic boom when
151. For the latest scandal, this one involving the "Final Four" accounting firm Ernst & Young, see
Cassell Bryan-Low, Accounting Firms Face Backlash over the Tax Shelters They Sold, WALL ST. J., Feb.
7. 2003, at A l.
152. Id. at A6 (statement of Donald M. Griswold, former KPMG tax partner).
153. 2 AICPA PROF'L STANDARDS, Responsibilities to Client, § 302, at 4681 (American Inst. of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1998). This change gave accountants an economic interest in the outcome of
the client's transactions, which is inconsistent with the AICPA's Auditing Standard that requires
accountants performing auditing services to maintain "an independence in mental attitude" and to "be
without bias with respect to the client." I AICPA PROF' L STANDARDS, The General Standards, § 220.03,
at 161.
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companies were struggling to meet their earnings estimates. The complexity
of the tax laws made these investors an easy target for the aggressive
marketing tactics of the big accounting firms. Many of these investors
claimed they did not understand the transactions but instead relied on the
blue-chip reputations of the large accounting and law firms that backed
them. 1
54
A fourth contributing factor is that the standards of professional conduct,
as well as the tax laws themselves, allowed these transactions to proliferate.
In particular, the lawyers involved in these transactions were able to hide
behind imprecise standards of professional conduct in order to issue
questionable legal opinions on the legitimacy of the transactions.
Fifth, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995155 made it
much more difficult to bring private suits for violations of the securities
laws. 156 Because the legislation is regarded as pro-defendant, many believe
this legislation has contributed to a general climate of fraud.
157
Lastly, the Service has been ineffective in policing these aggressive tax
avoidance transactions because it has been an agency under siege since the
beginning of the congressional hearings in 1996. The resulting 1998 reform
legislation and the diversion of the Service's resources to fulfill its
congressional mandate have kept it distracted from more aggressively
pursuing these abusive transactions.
V. WHAT IS CURRENTLY BEING DONE?
The government announced that it plans to aggressively pursue tax-
motivated transactions, and working toward this goal, Congress has
proposed changes to the accuracy-related penalty regulations. In addition,
the Treasury Department recently issued final regulations limiting the
defenses to the accuracy-related penalties. One commentator has remarked
that the proposed regulations represent the first step toward "shutting down
154. See Cassell Bryan-Low, supra note 151, at A I (giving an example of one such investor).
155. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771, 77z-1, 77z-2,
78a, 78j-1, 78t, 78u, 78u-4, 78u-5 (2000)).
156. See generally Ann Morales Olazabal, The Search for "Middle Ground": Towards a Harmonized
Interpretation of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act's New Pleading Standard, 6 STAN. J. LAW,
Bus. & FIN. 153, 155 (2001) (discussing the impact of the increased pleading requirement of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act).
157. See DONNA M. NAGY, ET. AL, SECURITIES LITIGATION AND ENFORCEMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS, 419 (2003) ("some observers have blamed the PSLRA for precipitating Enron, World Corn
and other recent securities frauds.").
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the 'tax shelter' industry."'' 58 The Service is working on three fronts to
attack abusive tax avoidance schemes: (1) it is pursuing promoters and other
professionals involved in these schemes with criminal penalties and
prosecutions, (2) it is requiring greatly increased disclosure of tax motivated
transactions at a much earlier point, and (3) it is pressuring Congress to
greatly increase the civil penalties for failure to comply with the disclosure
and reporting provisions.
A. Proposed Legislation
Under two bills currently pending before the Senate, 159 Congress has
proposed several new accuracy-related penalty provisions, as well as
significant amendments to the existing penalty provisions. Together with the
new reportable transaction regulations, these measures reflect the
government's frustration with the current lapse in disclosure standards. The
new provisions require greater disclosure for tax avoidance transactions
while greatly increasing the ante for failure to comply.
Under the new accuracy-related provisions, a failure to disclose a listed
or reportable transaction 160 having a significant tax avoidance purpose will161
result in an increased penalty rate of 30% of the understatement. This is a
strict liability penalty with no applicable exception.
If the transaction is disclosed, the usual 20% penalty applies to any
understatement, and a "strengthened reasonable cause exception" is
available. 162 In order for the new reasonable cause exception to apply, the
taxpayer must adequately disclose the relevant facts affecting the tax
treatment, 163 there must be substantial authority for the treatment, and the
158. Erika W. Nijenhuis, The New Disclosure and Listing Regulations for Tax Shelters, 97 TAX
NOTES 943, 944 (2002).
159. Under the U.S. Constitution, tax legislation must originate in the House of Representatives.
Thus, the Senate bill cannot go forward until the House reports a comparable bill. So far, the House has
not exhibited the eagerness of the Senate to address the problems that have allowed tax avoidance
transactions to proliferate.
160. A listed transaction generally is one that is specified by the Treasury Department as a tax
avoidance transaction whose tax benefits are subject to disallowance. A reportable transaction is one that
is required to be disclosed under § 6011. It includes listed transactions and five other categories of tax
avoidance transactions. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2003).
161. See J. COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF THE "CARE ACT OF 2003," NO. JCX-04-03,
Feb. 3, 2003, at 79-88, at http://www.house.gov/jct/x-4-03.pdf (Feb. 3, 2003) (proposing new I.R.C. §
6662A pertaining to listed and reportable avoidance transactions). A public entity that is subject to the
penalty must report the penalty to the SEC when it has exhausted its administrative and judicial remedies,
or earlier if the penalty is paid before then. Id. at 80-81.
162. Id. at 82.
163. Id. Adequate disclosure is determined in accordance with the reportable and listed transaction
regulations under I.R.C. § 6011, as well as under § 6662 regulations. Thus, there may be two disclosures
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taxpayer must reasonably believe that the claimed tax treatment is "more
likely than not" the proper treatment. 164 In determining "reasonable belief,"
the taxpayer may rely on an opinion of a tax advisor provided neither the
advisor nor the opinion are "disqualified."'1
65
Because the substantial authority standard is a higher reporting standard
than the realistic possibility standard,166 there will be less "wiggle room"
than under the former realistic possibility standard. The higher standard
combined with increased penalties should result in greater disclosure of
aggressive return positions.
A new 40% penalty (20% if adequate disclosure is made) applies to
understatements attributable to any transaction that "lacks economic
substance."' 167 This penalty also is a no-fault penalty, which is interesting
because the economic substance doctrine is very subjective and in fact, has
been inconsistently interpreted by the courts. 168 There is likely to be much
required, although the Service has indicated that it may consider allowing taxpayers to use a single
disclosure document provided it contains all relevant information and is submitted to the Office of Tax
Shelter Analysis. See 67 Fed. Reg. 79894.
164. J. COMM. ON TAXATION. supra note 161, at 82.
165. Id. A disqualified advisor under the Joint Committee Proposal is,
[A]ny advisor who (1) is a material advisor [defined in terms of participation in the
transaction and in terms of income derived] and who participates in the organization,
management, promotion or sale of the transaction or is related . . . to any person who so
participates, (2) is compensated directly or indirectly by a material advisor with respect to the
transaction, (3) has a fee arrangement with respect to the transaction that is contingent on all
or part of the intended tax benefits from the transaction being sustained, or (4) as determined
under regulations prescribed by the Secretary. has a continuing financial interest with respect
to the transaction.
Id. at 84 (footnotes omitted).
A disqualified opinion is one that is,
(1) based on unreasonable factual or legal assumptions (including assumptions as to future
events), (2) unreasonably relies upon representations, statements, finding or agreements of the
taxpayer or any other person. (3) does not identify and consider all relevant facts, or (4) fails to
meet any other requirement prescribed by the Secretary.
Id. at 85.
166. For a discussion and analysis of the various reporting standards, see Jasper L. Cummings, Jr.,
The Range of Legal Tax Opinions, with Emphasis on the 'Should' Opinion, 98 TAX NOTES 1125 (2003).
167. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 161, at 86. A transaction has economic substance if it
changes the taxpayer's economic position in a meaningful way, and has a substantial non-tax purpose, and
the transaction is a reasonable means of accomplishing that purpose. Id. at 86 n. 159. A transaction that is
determined to be a sham does not have economic purpose and neither does one in which the present value
of the tax consequences exceed the present value of the economic benefits to a tax-indifferent party. See
id. at 86. A tax-indifferent party is defined as one who is "not subject to Federal income tax or... to
whom an item would have no substantial impact on its income tax liability." Id. at 77.
168. See generally Stewart Patton, Treasury Regulation § 301.6111-2T and the Economic Substance
Doctrine: A Plea for Certainty in the Tax Law, 39 Hous. L. REV. 499 (2002).
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litigation over this provision if it should be enacted, because the parameters
of the economic substance doctrine are unclear and the penalty is draconian.
Therefore, taxpayers subject to this penalty will be motivated to litigate.
The new provisions also make it more difficult to compromise the
imposition of the penalty. 69  The latter provision obviously reflects
Congress's dissatisfaction with the high rate of compromise and settlement
previously seen with the accuracy-related penalties.
Also, a public entity that is required to pay a penalty under the pending
legislation will be mandated to disclose the penalty to the SEC, regardless of
whether the taxpayer considers the penalty to be material.17  Failure to
disclose the penalty will be regarded as a failure to disclose a listed
transaction. 171
Congress also has proposed changes to the existing accuracy-related
provisions. For corporate taxpayers, there is a new, higher threshold of
"substantiality."'' 72  The substantial authority standard is increased to
"reasonable belief that the tax treatment was more likely than not the proper
treatment."'' 73 The preparer's penalty standard is altered to conform to the
taxpayer's standard. 74 In addition, the "not frivolous" standard is replaced
with the "reasonable basis" standard, 175 and the penalty is increased from
$250 to $1000 ($5000 in the case of willful or reckless conduct). 176 Thus, a
return that contains an understatement of tax attributable to an undisclosed
position, for which there is not a reasonable belief that the tax treatment is
more likely than not proper will result in an increased penalty for the
169. In specific, once the penalty has been included in the Revenue Agent's Report, it cannot be
compromised for purposes of a settlement without the personal approval of the Commissioner or the head
of the Office of Tax Shelter Analysis. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 161, at 82-83. Also, the
Service is required to report to Congress the penalty application, each penalty compromised, and the
reasons for the compromise. Id. at 83.
170. Id. at 87.
171. Id. The penalty must be disclosed at the earlier of (1) the time the penalty is paid, or (2) the point
at which the taxpayer has exhausted all administrative and judicial remedies in contesting the penalty. Id.
This provision, if enacted, is likely to have a beneficial effect on compliance because companies care
about their reputation, and the effect that a decline in stock prices associated with fines and negative
governmental action will have on their public image. See Ehsan H. Feroz, et al., The Financial and
Market Effects of the SEC's Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases, 29 J. ACCT. RES. 107, 122-
25 (1991 ) (documenting the impact of SEC investigations and enforcement actions on companies' stock).
172. Under the proposal, an understatement is substantial if its amount "exceeds the lesser of (1) 10
percent of the tax required to be shown on the return for the taxable year (or, if greater, $10,000), or (2)
$10 million." J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 161, at 88. The former threshold was viewed as too
low for multi-million dollar corporations.
173. Id. (amending I.R.C. § 6662(d)(2)(B)).
174. id. at 95.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 96.
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preparer. If the position does not have a reasonable basis, the penalty will be
imposed regardless of disclosure.
Some tax practitioners (in particular promoters of aggressive avoidance
proposals) have refused to cooperate with the Service by failing to turn over
material they claimed is privileged. Under the federally authorized tax
practitioner privilege, 177 enacted under RRA '98, communications between a
taxpayer and a federally authorized tax practitioner are privileged to the
extent that the communication otherwise would be considered privileged
under the attorney-client privilege, subject to certain specific exceptions. 78
This privilege does not apply, however, with respect to corporate tax
shelters. 179
The Service has been frustrated by what it calls "unmerited claims of
privilege" and the significant obstacles that these claims have posed to its
enforcement efforts.180 Under the new proposals, the corporate tax shelter
exclusion is extended to all tax shelters, whether the parties are corporations,
partnerships, individuals, tax-exempt entities or other entities. 181 While the
parameters of the federally authorized tax practitioner privilege have yet to
be fully defined, 182 and in fact, have been called "a trap for the unwary," the
problem with the proposed legislation is that it evidences a troubling shift in
how the Service will regard the attorney-client privilege.1 83 The problem is
that this legislation may encourage clients to be less forthcoming with their
attorneys. 1
84
The pending legislation also proposes to extend the statute of limitations
for the entire return from three years to six years if the taxpayer fails to
disclose a listed transaction, which is a transaction the Service identifies as
tax motivated. 185 Further, any interest attributable to these penalties will not
be deductible. 1
86
177. I.R.C. § 7525.
178. I.R.C. § 7525(a).
179. I.R.C. § 7525(b).
180. See John Williams, Jr., Speech to the Texas Federal Tax Institute (June 6, 2002), in TAX NOTES
TODAY, July 7, 2002, LEXIS 2002 TNT 110-29.
181. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 161, at 89.
182. See Peter A. Lowy, Will Courts Ever Give the Tax Practitioner Privilege a Fair Shake?, 98 TAX
NOTES 999, 999 (2003) (discussing United States v. KPMG, L.L.P., 237 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D.D.C. 2002)).
183. Robert T. Smith, After the Alamo: Taxpayer Claims of Privilege and the IRS War on Tax
Shelters, 98 TAX NOTES 233, 238 (2003).
184. Id. at 253.
185. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 161, at 100 (proposing an amendment to I.R.C. § 6501).
186. Id. at 100-01 (proposing an amendment to I.R.C. § 163).
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Finally, the Senate demonstrates its seriousness in eradicating abusive
tax avoidance schemes by recommending that the Service be given an
additional $300 million per year dedicated to combating abusive tax
avoidance transactions.87
In addition to the new reforms, the Service is stepping up its
enforcement efforts by pursuing criminal penalties against some of the
promoters of the more aggressive tax avoidance schemes. 188 Until the new
disclosure provisions take effect, the Service is likely to prosecute those who
promoted or marketed aggressive tax avoidance schemes.
B. Accuracy-Related Penalty Regulations
The Service was not content to wait for the proposed legislation to be
enacted by Congress. At the end of December 2002, the Treasury
Department released proposed regulations, now released as final regulations,
that limit defenses to the accuracy-related penalties when taxpayers fail to
disclose reportable transactions or take positions without disclosure based on
the invalidity of a regulation. 89 In specific, the proposed regulations provide
that taxpayers may no longer rely on the advice or opinions of tax advisors to
establish reasonable cause and good faith as a basis for avoiding the
accuracy-related penalty in these cases.' 90 The rationale is that the failure to
disclose a reportable transaction or a position contrary to a regulation is itself
indicative of bad faith. Thus, a taxpayer may not rely upon the bad faith of a
tax preparer or advisor to establish good faith sufficient to avoid the
accuracy-related penalty. 191 This amendment should reap a benefit to the
Service in the form of increased compliance because it will help to prevent
the coercion of tax practitioners by greedy, unscrupulous clients. In
addition, if a position relates to a reportable transaction,'92 and is contrary to
187. Id. at 101.
188. See, e.g., David L. Lupi-Sher, Tax Attorney Pleads Guilty in Tax Shelter Fraud, 95 TAx NOTES
989, 989-90 (2002) (providing the example of a Philadelphia attorney who pled guilty to charges of
conspiracy to defraud the IRS based on the creation of a bogus tax shelter, and to corruptly endeavoring to
obstruct or impede the due administration of the Internal Revenue laws); David L. Lupi-Sher, Tax
Attorney's Indictment Raises Shelter Litigation Questions, 94 TAX NOTES 1582, 1583-84 (2002) (same).
189. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c)(1)(iii), (c)(2), 67 Fed. Reg. 79894 (Dec. 31, 2002).
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. See I.R.C. § 6011. Reportable transactions are those in which the transaction affects the
taxpayer's tax liability. They fall into two general categories: (1) those that the Service has determined
constitute tax avoidance transactions and (2) other reportable transactions. The latter category includes (a)
transactions offered under conditions of confidentiality, (b) transactions offering contractual protections
against loss of tax benefits, (c) transactions involving SEC-reporting companies and other large businesses
with a book-tax difference of greater than $10 million in any taxable year, (d) transactions producing
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a revenue ruling or IRS notice (other than a notice of proposed rulemaking),
the taxpayer cannot rely on the realistic possibility standard as a defense to
the accuracy-related penalty.
Instead, the taxpayer would have to satisfy the adequate disclosure
requirement. 193  Under the newly finalized regulations, the adequate
disclosure standard must be met under both the accuracy-related penalty
provisions 94 and the reportable transaction provisions. 19 5 Thus, the taxpayer
may be required to file more than one disclosure form for the same
transaction. 
96
The regulations further clarify that disclosure and reliance on the advice
of a professional will not necessarily insulate the taxpayer from the accuracy-
related penalty. 197 The taxpayer must have reasonably relied in good faith on
the advice of the professional. 198 In determining reasonable reliance and
good faith, the Service will consider all facts and circumstances, including
the taxpayer's "education, sophistication and business experience." 199 The
Service warns that it will rigorously apply the facts and circumstances test in
determining good faith and reasonable reliance on professional advice.
losses in excess of specified thresholds and (e) transactions involving short holding periods and generating
tax credits in excess of $250,000. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b) (as amended in 2003). Previously, there was
no specific penalty for failing to disclose, although a nondisclosure was likely to jeopardize the taxpayer's
chances of using the reasonable cause and good faith defense under I.R.C. § 6664(c). Under the CARE
Act of 2003, Congress proposes a minimum penalty of $50,000, ($100,000 for listed transactions), which
doubles the penalty for high net worth individuals and large entities. It applies in addition to the accuracy-
related penalties. J. COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 161, at 80.
193. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(a), (d).
194. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-3(c)(1) (as amended in 1998).
195. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4. The list of reportable transactions has been expanded under the new
regulation that became effective on February 28, 2003. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4(b).
196. See supra note 163 and accompanying text. The explanation of the provisions states that the
Treasury Department and the IRS may consider allowing taxpayers to use a single disclosure form
provided the form contains all the required information and a copy of the form is submitted to the Office
of Tax Shelter Analysis. See IRS Proposed Regulations (REG-126016-OJ) Limiting Accuracy Penalty
Defenses for Failing to Disclose Reportable Transactions, Positions Conflicting with Rules, 250 DAILY
TAX REP., Dec. 31, 2002, at L- l.
197. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4(c), 67 Fed. Reg. 79894, 79897 (Dec. 31, 2002) (discussing
determination of the taxpayer's reasonable reliance).
198. Id.
199. Id. The proposed effective date of these regulations is December 30, 2002, and will apply to
returns filed after that date, with respect to transactions entered into on or after January 1, 2003. Id. at
79896.
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C. Will This Work?
The imprecise accuracy-related penalty and ethical reporting standards
of the current law have allowed the proliferation of abusive tax avoidance
schemes. The pending legislation will "cure" this problem by elevating and
equating the taxpayers' standards and the preparers' standards while
requiring greater disclosure. The higher "more likely than not" standard
combined with the increased penalty for noncompliance should establish a
normative standard.
The pending legislation is interesting because when Congress attacked
tax shelters in the 1980s, it was through the enactment of substantive
provisions such as the passive activity Ioss2°° and the at risk rules. 20' The
pending provisions, however, attack tax avoidance transactions, through
procedural rules requiring greater disclosure and greatly increased penalties
for failure to comply, that are likely to prove more resilient than the
substantive rules.
The pending legislation, if enacted, does present several problems,
however. First, there is a danger that it could create an unworkable morass
of rules, penalties and regulations.20 2 Second, the bills require a tremendous
amount of disclosure by taxpayers. This will further increase compliance
costs, but more importantly, the amount of disclosure required may be too
great to be meaningful to the Service. If so, the new penalties could be as
ineffective as the current ones. Third, the pending legislation has the
potential to stymie legitimate tax avoidance transactions. Fourth, the
Service's list of substantial authority does not include some authority that
courts often consider in making their determinations, such as treatises and
law review articles. Since the reporting standard has been elevated and the
penalties have been greatly increased, the Service should expand its list of
authorities that it considers substantial. Also, the Service should consider
allowing well-reasoned professional opinions to constitute substantial
authority in the absence of other authority.
If the legislation is enacted, a further problem facing the Service is
whether the increased penalties and reduced practitioner discretion will
promote even further the adversarial view of the tax system, and further
encourage noncompliance. We as tax professionals must work to prevent
this by encouraging a climate of cooperation and collegiality with the
Service, because it is only through such a climate of mutual respect and
200. I.R.C. § 469.
201. I.R.C. § 465.
202. This concern was expressed by Beckett Cantley, supra note 91, at 135.
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cooperation that our system of voluntary compliance can effectively
function.
We also must take steps to ensure that ethical standards are properly
enforced. On November 18, 2002, IRS Chief Counsel B. John Williams
urged attendees at the University of Chicago's 55th Annual Federal Tax
Conference "to observe the highest ethical and professional standards as they
advise clients and transact business., 20 3 He further urged tax professionals
to "embrace ethical reform regardless of the specific parameters of the
[pending] Circular 230 revisions. 20" In return, he promised that his office
would try to ease taxpayers' burden, with respect to the complexity of the tax
laws, by doing a better job of communicating with the public through
205published guidance.
As tax professionals in a voluntary compliance system, the buck starts
with us, but it stops with Service. The Service must continue to indicate
clearly to the public that it is concerned about taxpayer rights and fair
treatment, and that it will deal harshly with those who violate standards of
ethics and fairness. In short, it must restore taxpayer confidence in the
system, and it must develop and maintain a good relationship with the tax
bar and other tax professionals.
In her remarks in the proceedings of this conference, Nina Olson said
that the IRS must learn to "stand in the shoes of the taxpayer.",206 So too
must taxpayers learn to stand in the shoes of the IRS. The public must
recognize that the tax code serves sociopolitical objectives other than raising
revenue, and that the Service administers not only the federal tax system, but
also a retirement system, a system of educational credits, and a social welfare
system. This is a tremendous job for a single, overburdened, underfunded
federal agency. These other objectives should be shifted to other federal
agencies to administer so that the Service can do the job it was created to do.
We, as tax professionals, should lobby for tax laws that are less complex,
203. Michael Bologna, IRS Chief Counsel Calls on Attorneys to Embrace Stricter Ethical Principles.
DAILY TAX REP., Nov. 20, 2002, at G-4 (quoting B. John Williams).
204. Id. In addition to the federal reforms, the states should amend their rules of professional
responsibility to provide uniformity with the federal rules on exceptions to confidentiality. In particular,
states must provide an exception to allow attorneys to prevent and rectify corporate fraud. This was
initially suggested by Roger Cramton at the midyear meeting of the ABA. See Patti Mohr, ABA Tax
Section Midyear Meeting: Tax Lawyers Seek Clarity on Economic Substance, 98 TAX NOTES 669, 669-
70 (2003) (discussing efforts to codify the economic substance doctrine).
205. Bologna, supra note 203, at G-4.
206. Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate, Speech at the University of Kansas Law Review
Symposium (Mar. 6, 2003).
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and for adequate funding for the Service so that it can deal effectively with
the problems it faces.
The concern, however, is that the Service lacks the resources to deal
adequately with the increased disclosure and with the increased caseload of
litigating the parameters of the new standards under the pending legislation.
The legislation will not solve the Service's problems of the growing
sophistication of taxpayers and new technology. The Service must keep
pace in order to deal effectively with the problem of widespread
noncompliance.
How does the Service do this in view of its dwindling resources? There
are four possible ways: (1) become more efficient at eradicating
noncompliance, which it is trying to do by requiring more disclosure and
higher penalties for noncompliance, (2) provide better education to taxpayers
and tax professionals on reporting and payment obligations, (3) establish
better relations with the public, and (4) prosecute to the fullest extent those
persons (taxpayers, promoters, other tax professionals, and IRS agents) who
persist in illegal and unethical behavior, particularly those who conceive of
and market abusive tax shelters.
In addition, the Service must work on its public image by demonstrating
that it is pursuing not just the lower income taxpayers, but also the higher
income individual and corporate taxpayers who attempt to avoid paying their
fair share of taxes. It must maintain consistency in its positions and it must
respect the rights of taxpayers. Otherwise, it will not earn the confidence of
the taxpaying public and this will be detrimental to the voluntary compliance
system.
VI. CONCLUSION
To return to the initial question: in a time of reduced IRS enforcement
activities, which in turn leads to reduced taxpayer compliance, do tax
professionals owe a duty (or a greater duty) to the tax system?
The issue of reduced taxpayer compliance is an important issue and one
in which we all have a considerable stake. The subject of the duty of tax
professionals to the tax system has been a matter of discussion for the past
forty years. While various reforms to the practitioner's standard have been
suggested in an effort to improve taxpayer compliance, the fact is that very
little has been done. Time has taught us that the debate and discussion have
focused on the wrong issue. The issue is not whether lawyers and other tax
professionals have a separate duty to the tax system, but whether there is an
enforceable or normative standard to which tax professionals must adhere.
Hopefully, this debate will conclude if the pending legislation is enacted
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because it is now painfully clear that relying on an ideological "duty to the
system" has not worked. Moreover, under the proposed legislation there will
be fewer opportunities for tax practitioners to use their discretion with
respect to aggressive return positions.
While it has been proposed that changes in the penalty provisions will
not have much effect on the conduct of those who seek to avoid paying their
fair share of tax liability, the pending legislation goes far beyond merely
tinkering with the penalty provisions. Enactment of this legislation should
give the Service a tremendous weapon in fighting abusive tax avoidance
schemes and outright tax evasion.
Will enactment of the legislation signal the end of aggressive tax
avoidance schemes? Probably not. Such schemes are as old as the tax
system itself. In fact, the remarks of Martin Ginsberg, testifying before the
House Ways and Means Committee on tax shelter legislation in the early
1980s remain applicable today: "The tax bar is the repository of the greatest
,,207ingenuity in America, and given the chance, those people will do you in.
207. Legislation Relating to Tax-Motivated Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. On Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong. 90 (1982)
(statement of Martin Ginsberg, Professor of Law. Georgetown University Law Center).
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